The primary concern for Bursa revolves around the future plan to address trigger criteria (e). It appears that SSLee may still have difficulty comprehending the Ernst & Young report, possibly due to a language barrier.

I hope that his struggle lies with his English proficiency rather than any prejudice or jealous sentiments towards Tony. It's quite immature to hold a bias against someone who isn't even aware of your existence.

Super simple English
There is no possible trigger as per current case

Tiada kemungkinan trigger lain untuk case ini

Chinese. Someone please translate

Thanks

It's important to highlight that my interpretation relies on publicly available data and may potentially contain inaccuracies

Reassessing the fundamental triggers that have led AirAsia into the PN17 situation. The challenges arising from the COVID-19 pandemic resulted in a complete halt of income alongside ongoing operational expenses. Consequently, the company incurred net losses that eroded its retained earnings

As retained earnings diminished and under the assumption that all other variables remained unchanged, AirAsia's shareholders' equity slipped below the critical 50% threshold. Thereby triggering the PN17 criteria. While this explanation does not delve into exhaustive details, it does recognise the integral role of total assets and liabilities in shareholders' equity

It is advisable for CapitalA's management to formulate a comprehensive debt management plan as an integral part of their overall strategy. This approach not only fosters confidence within Bursa but also aligns seamlessly with CapitalA's broader objectives

Regarding the remeasurement gains observed in CapitalA's quarterly results, it's worth noting that this scenario falls within the context of lease accounting, directly tied to the company's business model. The treatment and recognition of rights and obligations stemming from lease contracts are consistent with the provisions outlined in MFRS16, allowing lessees to adopt the fair value model

In summary, for CapitalA to present a robust regularisation plan to Bursa:

1. Provide a clear overview of CapitalA's organisational structure and business model, elaborating on the value proposition of each business segment, drawing insights from input shared by Mabel

2. Offer a thoroughly researched industry outlook for each business segment over the upcoming 12 months, citing information from reliable third-party sources

3. Present all financial statements in adherence to standard accounting reporting practices

4. Outline a range of scenarios that address the challenge of shareholders' equity along with the methodologies employed to navigate these scenarios

5. Develop a comprehensive debt management plan that seamlessly aligns with the overarching strategy, thereby fostering confidence among stakeholders and Bursa alike

It is plausible to assume that CapitalA possesses the necessary information for crafting a regularisation plan and may proceed to articulate it in writing following consultations with their appointed Adviser

Once again, I would like to clarify that I am a representative of general public and do not maintain any affiliations with the parties involved. Therefore, there is a possibility that I might misinterpret the situation and offer an imprecise evaluation of the CapitalA case

It is evident that SSLee lacks English comprehension and a proper understanding of Ernst & Young's unqualified audit opinion. He has misinterpreted Practice Note 17 and developed his own erroneous interpretation. CapitalA needs to achieve a 50% shareholders' equity threshold, as this criterion was triggered according to Practice Note 17. Despite this being communicated previously, it appears that you still do not grasp the concept. I can now understand why some individuals have labeled you as liar, although I disagree with that assessment. It's not that you are intentionally deceptive, but rather that you struggle with comprehending both English and accounting principles, yet you feign understanding

Quote

Ernst & Young PLT
AirAsia in an announcement today stated that it has triggered the Practice Note 17 (PN17) criteria of the Main Market Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia. This follows: (1) the issuance by its external auditor, Messrs Ernst & Young PLT, an unqualified audit opinion with emphasis of matter on material uncertainty relating to a going concern in respect of AirAsia's audited financial statements for the financial year ended 31 Dec 2019; and (2) AirAsia’s shareholders’ equity on a consolidated basis declining to only 37% of its share capital (excluding treasury shares) as at 31 Mar 2020, breaching the 50% requirement.

Unquote

P.S I will try to use super simple English from now on

The concerns raised by others regarding your March post are rooted in your assertion that AAX requires a subsequent round of capital reduction, consolidation, and a cash call to resolve its PN17 status. It's crucial to emphasize that this suggestion inaccurately portrays the situation, thereby exposing the speculative nature or misinformation present in your statement

Furthermore, it's worth highlighting that despite a 10 to 1 share consolidation, AAX remains classified as a PN17 company. This is contrary to your statement's implication that AAX has successfully emerged from PN17 due to its improved balance sheet. Once again, this assertion is unfounded, revealing a lack of comprehensive understanding of the complete situation

It would be inappropriate to seek the opinion of the general public on whether CapitalA can submit a regularisation plan to Bursa, as such a discussion could lead to speculation and rumours. The suitable avenue for addressing this specific matter is by engaging with CapitalA's investor relations, which aligns with the rights and responsibilities of shareholders under corporate governance principles

For a thorough understanding, it is advisable to carefully review the publicly available news release. I suggest revisiting the unqualified audit opinion issued by Ernst & Young PLT concerning the Airasia case, focusing on the specified criteria outlined in the report. It's important to note that while the answer was provided in yesterday's post, there remains a possibility of misinterpretation since I represent the general public and not any involved parties in this case

Efforts should be made to fully grasp the triggering criteria detailed in Practice Note 17 for the case of CapitalA (formerly known as AirAsia Berhad). A thorough understanding of these triggers is necessary to identify the root causes and develop appropriate solutions for each case

The airline, CapitalA (formerly AirAsia Berhad), activated the PN17 criteria in July 2020 due to an unqualified audit opinion issued by its external auditors, Ernst & Young PLT. This opinion expressed material uncertainty regarding the going concern of the company's financial statements for the fiscal year ending December 31, 2019. Furthermore, the consolidated shareholders' equity was found to be 50% or less of its share capital

This occurrence falls under Paragraph 2.1 of the Main Market listing requirement, section 2.0 (2.1)(e) of Practice Note 17. To comply with the requirements stipulated in PN17, CapitalA is obliged to present a comprehensive regularisation plan that satisfies the Exchange. This plan should demonstrate the company's ability to fortify its financial position, encompassing areas such as securities holders' equity, gearing, net asset position, cash flow, and the resolution of accumulated losses. It is important to note that this list is not exhaustive

The possibility of lifting CapitalA Practice Note 17 status hinges upon obtaining a waiver from Bursa Malaysia Securities for the adherence to Paragraph 8.04 (3)(a) of the Main Market listing requirements. This take into consideration that CapitalA group no longer triggers any prescribed criteria outlined in Paragraph 2.1 of the Main Market listing requirements

It is worth noting that PN17 does not include any provisions mandating a listed issuer to eliminate its entire debt and achieve debt-free status within a 12-month timeframe to exit PN17 classification. I hope this clarifies the subject matter for you. I may have overlooked or misinterpreted the criteria and obligations of PN17

Forward bookings are a standard practice within the aviation industry. While I lack precise statistics differentiating between advance reservations for future travel and spontaneous bookings for immediate travel, it is my belief that a significant portion of individuals strategically plan their trips or vacations well in advance—spanning periods like 3 to 9 months. As such, forward bookings represent recognised revenue within this sector, a principle applicable not only to AirAsia

In terms of debt management, it is imperative that AirAsia showcases a consistent capability to meet interest obligations while gradually reduce the principal amount over specified timeframes. This financial competency should be seamlessly integrated into the PN17 regularisation plan. This comprehensive strategy should encompass revenue projections, thoughtful assessments of industry recovery, and the prospective expansion of non-aviation ventures under the umbrella of the CapitalA organisation

The aviation industry operates in cycles, and it has faced its toughest challenge in the last three years due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This predicament has led AirAsia to experience a significant downturn, resulting in a complete halt of income and an accumulation of substantial debt. Nonetheless, the situation is gradually ameliorating as countries lift travel restrictions and people exhibit an increasing inclination to travel

While AirAsia's revenue is anticipated to rebound in the post-pandemic phase, it is imperative for the company to meticulously reduce its debt over a sustained period. A methodical long-term approach to debt management is essential and coupled with a progressive recovery of revenue. Considering these variables and in the absence of unforeseen adverse events, it is plausible that the company's stock price will ascend in parallel with the gradual revenue recovery