I stay away from iCAP share. Not even 1 share.
But I regularly visit this iCAP forum to check out the good discussions contributed by knowlegable people like @dumbMoney. Thank you for the good inputs.
I'm also not surprised that whenever AGM time is near, not only aggrieved shareholders, but some of their detractors also appear here.
@FastMoney, I also read about your comment on the advanced knowledge of 55%. :)
Keep it up!

When good alternatives arrive, even T20 may desert Starbucks. Don't underestimate the power of value for money coffee chain. Mainland China offers a lesson.
As consumers turned cautious amidst economic uncertainty, the once disgraced homegrown Luckin Coffee has now dethroned Starbucks. It has >10k stores vs Starbucks' 6k in China. Its revenue grows at close to 100% vs Starbucks single digit. Nothing stays constant.

Digital bank asset: capped at RM3b
RHB asset: >RM300b
Maybank, about RM1 trillion
Another nonsense, as usual

If you buy RHB because of its dividends, you should be contented because RHB still maintains its dividend. You've achieved your objective.

But if you buy RHB because you expect its dividend yield will help attract more investors, thereby pushing up share price so that you may exit with a handsome capital gain, well, it has not worked out that way, not yet. Such an expectation means you depend on the market to come to your view. However currently the market doesn't just look at dividends, but also factors like growth, asset quality and others.

Under IFRS17, compare 1H23 to 1H22, there is still a substantial increase in net investment income (RM252m vs RM126m)

Setting aside fluctuating FV changes, impairment and so on, the main increase has come from investment income on financial assets not measured through profit or loss (RM231m vs RM184m. I wonder if it benefits from interest rate rise)

Most of STMB's investment is in relatively low risk fixed income instruments. As long as the interest rate and economic condition remain stable for next few quarters, the investment income will probably be above RM100m per quarter. This could offset the decline in insurance service results (which might also be temporary?)

I look up Allianz's notes. It explains that VFA (Variable Fee Approach) is a mandatory modification of the General Measurement Model regarding treatment of CSM, in order to accommodate direct participating contracts.

As I understand, Takaful concept is risk sharing. So by default should be participating, right? So should adopt VFA.

Are you saying that STMB's higher investment return (even after netting off profit expenses) may not fully belong to shareholders?
If that is the case, the financial statement will be quite misleading. The excess reported profit will have to be deducted in the future, but how?

"Classified" as shareholder fund, but not economically? Does it mean the fund is presented as shareholders owned, yet the benefits are not for shareholders?
If that is the case, the profit shown will be very misleading. Worse than IFRS4 time.

By the way what is GMM?

Yes, I also notice STMB has tweaked its Q1 number. It means its IFRS17 transition work is active into Q2. Is this common among other insurers/ takaful players? Is this an indication about competence?

You’re right that purely looking at insurance service, 1H22 insurance service results have dropped 25% after IFRS17 (RM137m vs RM184m)
I also noticed that, measured in IFRS17, insurance service has experienced decline. RM96m in 1H23 vs RM137m in 1H22. The result is only saved by investment return.

Looking at Note 28, most of the “other investment RM8,871m” consist of fixed assets. The corresponding 1H23 income of RM231m implies about 5% yield, which is reasonable. These incomes should be shared with policyholders’ funds.

Is the sharing represented by “Net profit expenses from takaful contracts issued”, which is RM102m?

In other words, shareholders got slightly more than half of the investment gain. Do you think this ratio is too high?

Good sharing. Based on my observation, this company is better suited for investors looking for dividend accumulation rather than capital appreciation. Sleepy stock like UP. But can sleep well with it.

Pinky, this is a regular dividend stock like your UP. What prompted you to sell then, and to buy now?

@wsb_investor, you mentioned STMB has higher CSM release rate (annualized 19% versus Allianz 12%), which supports its higher PBT.
Putting management choice aside, could it be STMB’s life policies have shorter average duration than Allianz’s?
Assume a constant scenario. If CSM is evenly released, it will be completely released in RM1,117m/ (RM109m*2) = 5.1 years.
By contrast, could Allianz’ policies have a longer average duration = 1/12% = 8.3 years?

If STMB keep growing its business, it can also replenish the CSM despite fast release. After all the Family Takaful industry has a higher growth rate than conventional life.

Note 24 also shows that amount of CSM recognized is growing. The half year release was RM116m versus RM109m a year ago (7% growth)

Compare first half 2023 to first half 2022:
Family Takaful revenue grows at 22% (RM601m vs RM492m)
General Takaful revenue grows at 25% (RM600m vs RM479m)
Group PBT grows at 24% (RM261m vs RM211m)

Several analysts have turned cautious towards RHB. They've cut FY23-25 earning forecasts by 9-10% (HLIB), by 10-11% (CIMB), by 5% to 7% (MIDF). As a result, their TPs have been cut back - RM6 from RM6.6 (HLIB), RM6.56 from RM7.62 (CIMB), RM6.66 from RM7.58 (MIDF)

The reasons cited by HLIB -- NIM compressed, loans growth lost traction, and GIL ratio nudged up. LLC has gone down to 83%.

CIMB mentioned RHB Bank missed (albeit marginally) all of its FY23F KPIs:
1. ROE of at least 11% (achieved 10.6%)
2. Loan growth of 4-5% (achieved 1.9% in 1H23)
3. CASA of 30% (achieved 27.6%)
4. GIL of 1.5% or lower (1.64% as at end-Jun 23)
5. Cost-to-income ratio of 44.6% or below (achieved 47.5%)

But CIMB did mention that a higher dividend payout (given its strong CET1 ratio of 17.1%) could be a re-rating catalyst.

I believe most analysts are not concerned about IFRS4 versus 17 profits. They have been guided by management that total life time profits remain unchanged.
Besides, most of their valuation method consists of P/B multiple of general insurance + EV multiple of life insurance. So their valuations are not driven by a single year profit.

The headline shows record quarterly revenue and profit.

However, look closer at the income statement. Group operating profit before allowances for 2Q was RM936m (declined 10.9% YoY from RM1,051m a year ago). On 6M basis, it was RM1,987m (declined 4.1% from RM2,073m a year ago)

The record profit was helped by two key factors.
1. Write back of management overlay on credit losses. 2Q writeback is RM132m, versus a charge of RM39m a year ago. On 6M basis, it was positive RM85m versus negative RM192m a year ago
2. The absence of prosperity tax. On 6M basis, tax and zakat was only RM496m (versus RM668m a year ago), or effective tax rate of 24% (versus 36% a year ago)

These two factors are one time.

Share price has reached/ soon to reach analyst TP - RM15.2 (Kenanga, buy), RM16.7 (Am, hold), RM16.7 (RHB, buy), RM16.75 (Maybank, buy).
If the coming result is good, analysts are likely to revise TP upward to keep their buy calls, which is minimum 10% above prevailing price.

Another good quarter. For the last 3 years, net interest income fluctuated at around RM43m - RM52m per quarter. It is RM46m in the latest quarter. The good result in recent quarter is contributed by rising non-interest income.

Impairment on financings has been coming down to RM4.7m (versus RM8.2m last quarter, and RM8.2m a year ago). Credit cost is 93 basis points. This is good. Hopefully this is a new trend after recording on average about 150 basis points per quarter throughout FY23.

Gross financing continues to grow modestly to RM2,045m (+1.2% QoQ, +7.4% YoY). This is in line with management's guidance to analysts earlier that the company financing growth will track the banking industry. It's better to grow conservatively through quality financing.

One bright spot with RCE is the Board is willing to return excess capital to shareholders. Not only through increased dividends, where payout ratio has increased from 30% a few years ago to current 60%, but also the 18 sen special dividends in late 2022.

As a result, the company has reversed the ROE decline seen earlier. Despite its growing business size, ROE has actually risen back to 17% - 18% range. This is rare and impressive act. Such attitude of taking care of shareholders is probably one reason that the market has re-rated its share.

A good sharing from YAPSS.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HAv8IrcfPnA

Charlie Munger advised people who could afford the claim to self-insure rather than buying insurance policies.

But with one exception, which is medical insurance, where insurance companies have negotiated better deals with health care providers. While this is true in US, does it apply to Malaysia? I've heard private doctors recommending unnecessary procedures just because patients are covered by insurance.

Yeah, let's hope the volume can support too. EPF selling has either slowed down or stopped their selling.
If price continues to strengthen and the coming quarterly result is good, most likely analysts will revise TP upwards in order to keep their buy calls.

Out of these 3 stocks, I like Allianz the most. Allianz’s 5-year return is not as impressive as RCE, but it is still much better than HLIND. On unadjusted basis, its return was 21% (from RM12.50 to RM15.14). After dividends are included, it returned 54% (from RM9.81 to RM15.14). So, unlike HLIND, a 5-year investment in Allianz has at least earned the cost of capital for its shareholders!

More importantly, just like RCE Capital, Allianz has been returning excess cash to shareholders in increasing amount. Dividend per share has increased from 40 sen in 2018 to 85 sen in 2022, and is still increasing. So the market has taken notice recently. Share price has been moving upward in tandem.

Of course, there are many other good investment opportunities besides these three companies. I mention these three for illustration purpose – that good businesses and good management alone are no guarantee for good investment return. The Board has to be shareholders oriented, and is willing to share its fruits with the minorities!

Therefore until HLIND board shows sign by being more (minority) shareholders centric, I will continue to underweight HLIND and overweight Allianz.

On the other hand, RCE Capital was a pleasant surprise. For several years, the growth was rather weak at low single digit. RCE profit records are not superior to HLIND. But one big difference is RCE Board was willing to return excess capital to shareholders, thereby improving its capital efficiency as illustrated in its robust ROE.

After adjusting for the bonus share issue, annual dividend was increased from 3 sen in 2017, to 4 sen in 2018, 5 sen in 2019, 6 sen in 2020, 7 sen in 2021, and 9 sen in 2022. And there was another 18 sen special dividend in late 2022.

The market took notice of RCE’s good corporate governance. On a 5-year basis, share price grew 163% (from RM0.83 to RM2.22) on unadjusted basis. After factoring dividend, share price actually grew 296% (RM0.56 to RM2.22)!

I have reservation about HLIND’s cash hoarding right from the beginning. I also view HLIND as being less transparent versus the other two. For example, in its annual reports it would lump performances of different businesses together instead of providing breakdown. Unlike the other two, it also did not open to analysts through regular results updates.

Therefore it was not a surprise that HLIND share price remained range bound. In fact, on a 5-year basis (week 7-Aug-2018 to today), even after adding back dividends received, the total return was practically zero (RM8.98 to RM8.99). In fact, if dividends are excluded, the return would be -23% (RM11.70 to RM8.99)!

When I first commented on i3 a few years ago, I benefited from the insights of people like kywoo. Kywoo liked three companies – Hong Leong Industries, RCE Capital, and Allianz. It happened that I also liked them. Over the next two years we discussed the merits of these stocks on and off.

The three stocks had several similarities – strong business fundamentals, domestic markets, good management, mid/ small cap, continuous records of earnings and dividend payment over at least ten years, and the valuation was also not demanding.

But they also have differences – HLIND and RCE are controlled by local tycoons while Allianz is a MNC. REC had a smaller market cap then. It also operated in a niche market of personal loans to civil servants.

All time high was RM16.9 based on closing price on 3 Jan 2020. However, on dividend adjusted basis, today closing at RM14.94 is also all time high. The company has paid over RM3 in dividend in less than 4 years.

@DividendGuy67, thank you for your comments. Yes, this is my main concern with HLIND, that Quek has never intended to share the cash.
The track records of other Hong Leong companies are not exactly reassuring. I've mentioned a few examples earlier.

Fortunately, listing rules dictate that the controlling shareholder must seek EGM approval for any related party transaction that is above 5% of revenue/ profit/ asset value ...and the controlling shareholder has to abstain from the vote.
(They could still bypass minority shareholders' votes if RPT value is just below 5%, like how Genting Malaysia bailed out Empire Resorts by buying from Lim family's private asset.)
The key is the minority shareholders must be smart enough and united in rejecting any unfair deal. Such unity usually breaks down if the share price has been declining for a few years, as new shareholders/ traders may happily accept a privatization offer at 20% premium to prevailing share price, even though the offer price is a steep discount to the company's long term value. Recent example includes MMC privatization.

Fortunately, in HLIND case, the company performance has been good and consistent. I don't see any near term possibility for share price to drop to too low a level. Quek could not, for example, privatize at RM9 when share price drops to RM7
That doesn't stop Quek from trying to privatize at RM11 at current price of RM9. But I doubt it will succeed.

There could be other tricks that I'm not aware of. But as long as the Board is willing to pay dividends (dividends were paid even in mid 2020, albeit with a cut from 35sen to 25sen), the downside is limited.
To be prudent, I ignore the net cash in my valuation (you're right it's RM1.6b now; I wrote RM1.4b which should be 2022 net cash).
I don't like the RM400m investment in tile manufacturing, where there has been little explanation. But given that I've ignored the RM1.6b cash, I shall ignore RM400m too.
While 10X PE and 6% dividend yield may not be fantastic, it's good enough. I will only think about what to do with my holding (to sell or to hold) should market changes its mind, and for no good reason pushes it to RM10-11 range.

Fair enough. Afterall each of us has different return expectation and risk tolerance.

Dividend has grown modestly from 45sen in FY17 to 57sen in FY22, representing a CAGR of 4%. The current dividend yield at 6.3% implies limited downside – the reason that I continue to hold.

I will hesitate to add until there are signs of change by the Board.

I fully agree that this stock has a place within a dividend stock portfolio. My only gripe is its full potential has not realized.

The market may overlook a hidden gem for a few months, or even for a few years. But for 7 years? Note the share price has been going sideway since 2017.

Today a company fundamental data is easily accessible through various stock screeners. Not to mention professional investors who could access their Bloomberg terminals. How could a hidden gem be overlooked for 7 years in a competitive market?

More likely is, while this company has good potential, it also has defects (A more polite term will be it lacks the catalyst to unlock the value)

Yes, the company free cash flow runs into several hundred millions a year. It has accumulated 1.4b net cash. These are all very impressive. But holding idle cash incurs opportunity cost. In a stock market where cost of equity is about 10% per annum, cash gives only low single digit return.

This is the main reason that the Return on Equity has been falling from about 20% in the period of FY17 to FY19, to about 16% in FY21, and less than 15% in the past 12 months.

One major missing catalyst is when will the company better utilize the idle cash, through investment and/or return to shareholders. The least the management could do is to clearly communicate their intent to the investment community.

Clear communication is not self-promotion or inflating share price. Clear communication is actually being responsible to all shareholders - reassuring the minority shareholders that the Board and management have their best interest at heart, and outline what is being done to move the company forward.

Therefore, I do not see current situation as waiting for this jewel to be recognized by serious investors. Minority shareholders already have 7 years to “quietly and slowly” buy more. Surely 7 year is more than enough time to accumulate any position!

I see the situation as waiting for the Board and management to take steps to unlock the company value. They should take a leaf from YTL Power, where management has actively reached out to analysts and fund managers since last year to improve understanding. And now look at the results.

In a PE valuation model, share price = EPS * PE multiple.
It will take EV a long long time to displace ICE vehicles. So EPS will not be impacted, at least initially.
However, the impact to PE multiple can be immediate
This is happening to BAuto now. Despite solid market demand, its share has been de-rated by investors. 15% fall in a week

HLIND should take the lesson and prepare itself.
1. Work out a credible e-bike roadmap and communicate to the market
2. Clearly articulate its non-motorbike investments to the investing community
3. Return its mountain of idle cash to shareholders

This could re-rate the stock overnight. Surely the controlling shareholder also understand. The question is, are they willing to act on it?
Until they do, the institutional investors are standing at the sideline, despite Kenanga's recent coverage.

I like companies that publish their QR early (except Top Glove)

While car and motorcycle markets are different, HLIND shareholders need to keep an eye on how the local EV market evolves. The launch of Tesla's Model Y this week and BYD's Dolphin next week already leave their marks on BAuto share price.

Get from BursaMarketplace

unicornbird, definitions of revenue and profits change under accounting standards. Frankly I don't know how to compare/ explain. To better understand life insurance, you need to look beyond just revenue and profit

ICPS should be more valuable if held for long term due to higher dividends. But there should be a discount if it's held for short term because of poor liquidity. Given the ICPS premium versus ordinary shares has expanded a bit, I assume the company has drawn interest of some long term investors recently. But likely retail investors due to the small trading volume.

wsb_investor, thank you for sharing.
I read the slide. Red bars represent IFRS17 operating profits, whereas blue bars represent IFRS4
The operating profits for Indonesia is USD0.2b under IFRS17, versus USD0.3b under IFRS4. Similarly, Malaysia is USD0.3b under IFRS17, USD0.4b under IFRS4. Operaitng profits at both countries have declined under IFRS17.

For the majority of consumers, yes.
But for forward looking investors, their focus is on the first 5% market share. After crossing the 5% mark, e-bikes will dominate given the self sustaining momentum and economy of scale.

It took only a few years for the inferior digital cameras to displace film cameras. Kodak, despite invented digital cameras, was wiped out.
https://www.televisory.com/blogs/-/blogs/slump-in-digital-photography-are-smartphones-to-blame-

Closer to home, QL share price was boosted from RM2 to RM5 (split adjusted) between 2017 to 2020 by its tiny but fast growing Family Mart franchise. The business only crossed 10% of group revenue recently.

Maybe Hong Leong Yamaha will continue to dominate e-bike market. But it doesn't hurt if the management could articulate its strategy and roadmap to the investment community. Unless, of course, the Quek family doesn't care about share price.

Thames Water faces financial trouble.
https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/uk-working-contingency-plan-indebted-thames-water-sky-news-2023-06-28/

Among the water companies, Wessex is one of the best, if not the best, in terms of operating performance. It scored the highest customer satisfaction in 2021-22
https://www.ofwat.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/12/WCPR_2021-22.pdf

https://evbn.org/vietnam-electric-motorbike-market-makes-waves-1677801083/

The government will promote e-bikes not by restricting or penalizing traditional motorbike sales, but rather through subsidy, tariff exemption and other incentives for e-bikes. So it won't be a vote loser. However, it will take a while for the infrastructure and regulations to be in place, buying time for Yamaha.

Given Yamaha's dominance in Malaysian market, anything less than market leading position in e-bikes will not augur well. Vietnam offers good lesson.

Vietnam market leader Honda and Yamaha in were leapfrogged by multiple e-bike competitors. The current e-bike leader is VinFast under the Vingroup.

When the market shifted to electric, newcomers will disrupt existing order. I'm sure HLI is watching closely. But it is also dependent on Yamaha.

Extracted from CIMB report on YTL
" it could unlock value over the next few years by paring down stakes in assets such as Power Seraya and Wessex Water via a possible listing as investors continue to discount its RM72bn asset base (as at FY22)."

This is the suggestion by dragon328!
Are you their banker !!?

E bikes are not popular now. But great forces are pushing the market towards electric.
Government may offer incentives/ restriction in line with its climate change pledge. Malaysia has pledged to reduce carbon intensity against GDP by 45% by 2030 as compared to 2005 level.
ESG pressure could also force Grab and Foodpanda to promote e-bike riders through differentiated rates. So are ESG funds if HLI were to attract institution money.

Gaining a foothole in this future market is important. The first electric cars from BYD in 2010 looked ugly too.
http://www.electric-vehiclenews.com/2010/05/byd-e6-electric-taxis-hit-roads-in.html
But over time, as technology improves, even Ferrari will go electric (expected in 2025).
Yamaha cannot afford to repeat the mistake of Japanese car companies. If Yamaha has a good range, HLI can formulate a roadmap and have a good story to tell investors. Investors are forward looking. The changes in future market composition gets reflected in today valuation.

Can Neo help Yamaha to maintain its market share in the future?
https://www.e-scooter.co/yamaha-neos/

But it's investing RM400m in Guocera. To realise a good disposal value, the new factory has to be up and the business turned around, At least a few years from now.

Let's see if Kenanga's coverage could stimulate institutions' interest. Now I wonder whether the Dato's Jim Khor's buying could be related. Kenanga analyst could have made a company visit before they initiated coverage.

In the foreseeable future, I’m confident that HLI’s Yamaha franchise will continue to generate solid free cashs to support dividends. The current DY at above 6% is respectable.
Beyond that, anything is possible. When it happens, I just hope everyone gets a fair deal.

I've finished watching TTB's YouTube. His explanation is sensible.

Anyone interested on the Ringgit value may also check out The Edge Tong's Portfolio published on every Sat. The Edge's boss has written a number of articles on this topic, covering both cyclical and structural factors mentioned by TTB.

Apr 10: "What determines the exchange rate and is ringgit fundamentally undervalued?"
Apr 17: "The dichotomy of words and actions on the ringgit"
Latest: "A depreciated ringgit is an indirect tax on savings"

Tong touched on the interplay of these factors
1. interest rate differentials
2. inflation - also how our CPI was understated
3. trade balance - Malaysia has enjoyed 20+ years of current account surplus. But the surplus has dwindled, and how the magnitude is dependent on the commodity prices;
4. investment flow - how our share of FDI within ASEAN has dwindled since Asian Financial Crisis, coevred in depth in his other articles
5. investor confidence - Malaysia imposed capital control twice - in 1998, and a lesser form in 2016; scandal like 1MDB; political stability....
6. government debt, and so on.

So what happened to the cement factory which HLI invested in 2010?
Refer page 14-15 of HLI's 2014 Annual Report, HLI sold its interest to Narra in exchange for Narra's share issuance in 2013-14. Narra was renamed as Hume Industries Berhad, and the shares received by HLI was distributed to HLI shareholders.
The info can also be found in page 12 of Hume Industries Berhad 2015 Annual Report.

So the irony is, although the old Hume Industries owned the cement manufacturing license, their shareholders did not see the factory as the company was privatized in 2010.
Instead the license became Quek's private asset, whcih HLI invested in 2010 via ICPS, and in 2013 sold to Narra (the new Hume Industries today). It was HLI shareholders that got the distribution (although they indirectly funded the factory construction via HLI rights issue in 2010).

Afer the disposal of cement manufacturing interest, and now the disposal of Hume Cemboard Industries, HLI is almost a pure consumer product company (except Goucera, which I don't consider as consumer market).
Unless HLI return its cash to shareholders, it's unclear where the HLI ship will be heading next as it could easily tap into its cash pile for other acquisitions, on top of the RM400m investment in tile manufacturing announced early this year

A summary and follow up on the previously mentioned The Edge article of 2010.
That article mentioned that in early 2010, Quek managed to privatize (the old) Hume Industries. The offer price was RM4.30, raised to RM4.50 later, which was below net asset value of RM5.17. The NTA included 37% of net cash at RM1.90.
In other words, if net cash excluded, Quek privatized the company with NTA of RM5.17 - RM1.90 = RM3.27 at mere RM4.50 - RM1.90 = RM2.60, or about 80% of book value.
By paying RM280m in cash, Quek took full control and privatized the old Hume Industries which had RM362m cash.

But in the same year, he sold several businesses under now private Hume Industries (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd to HLI. HLI acquired Quek's now private assets by raising funds through rights issue.
Among the businesses sold to HLI included Hume Cemboard Industries Sdn Bhd, where the disposal was announced recently.

HLI also subscribed to the ICPS of Hume Cement Sdn Bhd (which was parked under Hume Industries before the privatization). Importantly, by the 6th anniversary of the ICPS issue date, HLI would have owned 75% of Hume Cement which now planned to utilize its license to build the cement factory.
These corporate development was reported in page 12 of HLI's 2011 Annual Report.

3iii, thank you for the sharing. I watched some part of it.
I agree it's good for any investor to pick up knowledge about balance of payment and other factors affecting currency movement.

However, I must point out that, maybe TTB can explain it well, but so are any good economist.
Besides, TTB's job is a value oriented equity fund manager, not an economist, nor a macro hedge fund manager.

If he could apply his macro knowledge to benefits his fund, even tangentially, it will be good for his fundholders.
But clearly he could only talk but fails to connect.
Anyone who could foresee that the Malaysian Ringgit is on a long term downward trend will be very dumb to hold half of his fund in Ringgit for over a decade.

After deducting for tax and management fee, the idle cash in Ringgit basically gives zero return to fundholders in nominal term, and negative return in real term due to inflation and Ringgit deprecation.
A smart manager would have converted the depreciating Ringgit to earning powers, in the form of ownership in good companies, long long time ago!

"ICAP is an excellent buy now, even for the shorter-term"
Really?

If it's such an excellent buy, why does ICAP with its RM100+m idle cash does not buy ICAP itself?
Why does TTB want new investors to benefit, but taking no action to benefit the ICAP old investors?

I'm a relatively new to HLI. I'm not familiar with its early history.
I found this article published in 2010 talking about HLI, Hume Cement, Hume Industries, the earlier round of delisting and Quek's private asset injection and so on.

https://theedgemalaysia.com/article/new-hli-looks-lot-former-hume

Is anyone familiar with that history? Could you share?

I also overlooked the privatization of Tasek by Hong Leong Asia.
This is another example of controlling shareholders picking the best time to privatize at cheap. The price chart showed that Tasek share price was above RM16 during the infrastruture boom in 2015. After several years of share price decline, Hong Leong offered to takeover at RM5.5! After failing, they raised a mere 30 sen to RM5.8 and they succeeded.
Long term minority sharehodlers, faced with the threat of delisting, just threw in the towel.
Nothing against Hong Leong. But generally I won't expect charity from these controlling shareholders. I'll be thankful if they don't take advantage of me.