https://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/berjaya-land-forms-jv-selangor-mbi-unit-klang-valley-river-projects-paving-way-rm10bil

BJLand即将推出一人一房项目？
https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2022/02/14/malaysians-excited-at-the-prospect-of-becoming-first-time-home-owners-with/2041519

BJLand即将推出一人一房项目？
https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2022/02/14/malaysians-excited-at-the-prospect-of-becoming-first-time-home-owners-with/2041519

bjfood 有戏...bjcorp 和 bjland 会是下一个吗？

老陈你会像老马一样飞还是死?

老陈你会像老马一样飞还是死?

(11) In future threads under #BcorpUpClose I will zoom in on each business and give an introduction of what it does and what we are thinking about competition and operations. This thread was to introduce what we have first.

(11) What is NOT owned under Berjaya Corp (this is FAQ)

• Berjaya Times Square - owned by Berjaya Assets Berhad, which is separately listed

• 7-11 & Caring - owned by separately listed 7-11 Malaysia Berhad)

• Football clubs - Cardiff, KVK & Sarajevo

• U-Mobile

(10) Past one year we have been busy doing internal housekeeping and focusing more on divestment to make the group leaner and more focused. I had envisaged my first year to be reorganising, restructuring and getting it focused. Year 2 & 3 will be growth & acquisition

Abdul Jalil Abdul Rasheed
CEO, Berjaya Corp Bhd

In the corporate world, it may take gumption for a family-run business to pass the baton to an outsider. Berjaya Corp Bhd (BCorp) is one company that took such a bold step to restructure its business.

Last April, founder Tan Sri Vincent Tan Chee Yioun took a non-executive role, having been redesignated as non-executive chairman, from executive chairman. This came after Abdul Jalil Abdul Rasheed, former president and CEO of Permodalan Nasional Bhd, was appointed as BCorp CEO in March.

The conglomerate then unveiled a three-year strategic plan to become an institutionalised high-performing consumer group with focused core business segments. Another goal is a massive cut in its debt by half to RM2.5 billion within the next three years, through asset or business disposals as well as dividend payments from its listed subsidiaries.

Execution will be key for BCorp to address its legacy issues, including the complicated corporate structure, related-party transactions as well as cross-ownerships among listed and non-listed entities. These factors had led to a lack of interest in the trading of BCorp shares.

While there were some disposals of non-core assets, the market had anticipated a more drastic move by the group to streamline its business structure.

Notably, Jalil Rasheed had publicly shared the intention to privatise Berjaya Land Bhd and sell Berjaya Sports Toto Bhd as well as to set up a hospitality real estate investment trust (REIT), though the board was quick to clarify that these plans had not been deliberated.

It will be interesting to see how the restructuring exercise will translate to its financials. — By Lee Weng Khuen

.. under Environment, we own Berjaya Enviro Holdings which does:

• landfill
• river cleaning
• recycling

.. under Financial Services, we own the following:

• InterPacific Asset Management (fund management)

• InterPacific Securities (stockbroking)

• Chailease (30% stake)

• Berjaya Sompo General Insurance (30% stake)

(9) Services - we have some segments given the breath of what ‘services’ is. We have:

• Gaming
• Digital - Redtone
• Financial Services
• Environment

(8) Hospitality - we own hotels in:

• Iceland
• UK
• Japan
• Seychelles
• Sri Lanka
• Vietnam
• Philippines
• Malaysia

(7) Property consists of development & investments (rental income). We have land in Selangor, Penang, Johor, Pahang & KL. Advantage here is that most of it were bought long time ago so we can wait for right time to develop it...

(6) Retail (Food) is what Berjaya Food Berhad is today. We ahve the following brands under that:

• Starbucks
• Krispy Kreme
• Kenny Rogers
• Simply Good - vegetarian
• Sala - vegan tex mex
• Kelava - vegan ice cream

(5) Under Retail (Non-Food), we have:

• Cosway
• Country Farms
• HR Owen

(4) We have now identified the following as our business focus:

• Retail (Non Food & Food)
• Property
• Hospitality
• Services - (Digital, Gaming, Financial Services & Environment)

(3) Previously BCorp had everything and anything. But last one year we identified what sector verticals we want to be in and focused on that. The pandemic also made us realise that whilst a diversified portfolio helped mitigate risk, having a focused one also mattered

(2) BCorp’s corporate office function (where I sit) is responsible for monitor performance of companies, capital allocation & new investments. The aim is not to have all our companies following cookie cutter approach. They each need to have their own culture and process

(1) BCorp is an investment holding co - which means its primary business is owning other companies. We don’t operate any companies from BCorp level. All our companies ahve their own Boards and mgmt who take care of daily operations.

10 months into my my role at Berjaya Corp (BCorp), I get many questions about businesses, some of which we dont even own. So thought I’ll do series of threads to explain what the BCorp owns, how Group looks like now and how it’ll look like in future #BCorpUpClose

https://twitter.com/jalilword/status/1483653475129245700/photo/1

https://twitter.com/aceCourtBot/status/1483739055837876224?t=8SvZrKVxH0qIdDpvEbji4Q&s=01

https://twitter.com/aceCourtBot/status/1483739055837876224?t=8SvZrKVxH0qIdDpvEbji4Q&s=01

Raya GreenPow soon?

https://www.nst.com.my/property/2022/01/764216/jalil-rasheed-provides-updates-10-months-his-role-bcorps-group-ceo
#BCorpUpClose

Raya GreenPow soon?

https://www.nst.com.my/property/2022/01/764216/jalil-rasheed-provides-updates-10-months-his-role-bcorps-group-ceo
#BCorpUpClose

However, before we do that, I need to highlight something first. If you recall, my BJCORP investment thesis in Part 1 did not promise a 3,000% return - in fact, it merely justified how an investor in BJCORP’s shares today could achieve a 300% return. That stark 10x gap was the difference between the latter’s base-case scenario’s valuation, and the former’s blue-sky scenario’s valuation.

Hence, while I do think that it is possible for BJCORP to attain its fabled 3,000% upside, I want to make it clear that I’m not saying that it is definitely going to happen. While I’m pretty confident about the investment thesis behind the 300% upside, I only believe that this 3,000% upside thesis is just that - a blue-sky scenario investment thesis. It will work in the best of circumstances where all the stars align, but you shouldn’t be counting your chickens on it hatching.

Having said that, we don’t even need this 3,000% upside to materialize in order to justify an investment in BJCORP’s shares today. Remember, the 300% upside thesis is fairly likely to materialize - as I’ve quite clearly demonstrated in Part 1. Furthermore, as I’ve also shown there, there is also very little risk inherent in the investment idea on top of that. Just because we only get a 300% upside and not 3,000% doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t be grinning from ear-to-ear - that’s still a 5-year CAGR of 25%.

However, as we’ll see below, neither does that mean that the potential for a 3,000% upside is unlikely. In fact, I think there’s a pretty decent chance of it, even if it doesn’t actually end up materializing. Like I mentioned earlier, all I’m saying is don’t count your chickens before they hatch. Only expect a 300% upside from this investment - but if you do eventually get the 3,000% upside, consider that a bonus from papa Buffett.

EQUITY
✨ BJCORP and the Mythical 3,000% Upside - Part 4
How BJCORP can potentially challenge Shopee Malaysia for the domestic e-commerce marketplace crown

Aaron Pek
Jan 17

Over the past several equity research reports about BJCORP, we explored the conservative base-case investment thesis for BJCORP with a 300% upside - and performed a deep-dive three statement analysis into the conglomerate.

However, until now we have omitted the low-probability blue-sky scenario investment thesis with a 3,000% upside - which we first discussed in Part 1. However the stratospheric upside warrants that we at least explore its feasibility.

In this report, we shall do some spelunking into how BJCORP could potentially pull together the dizzying array of business assets under its stable to form a credible challenger to the domestic e-commerce arm of SEA Ltd - Shopee Malaysia.

We also perform a cursory valuation analysis which attempts to determine whether attaining a 3,000% upside in this scenario is realistic or not. Spoiler: it is.

In my Part 1 report, we saw how BJCORP’s newly minted CEO Jalil publicly opined in a radio interview that he thought BJCORP’s intrinsic value was worth closer to RM 7.50 per share. The obvious spanner in the works here is that that valuation stands in stark contrast to BJCORP’s current share price of just RM 0.25 per share - implying that there exists a potential 3,000% upside.

Since then, I’ve also been repeatedly hinting at how I thought that one of their listed Berjaya companies SEM (7-11 Malaysia) was the Rosetta Stone under Berjaya’s huge stable of assets which could potentially unlock this magnificent upside. Just to illustrate how colossal a 3,000% upside is, that’s a 222% CAGR even if it took them 10 years to unlock this stratospheric valuation. You could invest $50,000 today and retire a millionaire (post-inflation) after 10 years - without having to lift a finger in between.

In this final conclusion to wrap up our bottomless analysis into BJCORP over the past month, we are going to explore how this mythical otherworldly upside could potentially be achieved.

However, before we do that, I need to highlight something first. If you recall, my BJCORP investment thesis in Part 1 did not promise a 3,000% return - in fact, it merely justified how an investor in BJCORP’s shares today could achieve a 300% return. That stark 10x gap was the difference between the latter’s base-case scenario’s valuation, and the former’s blue-sky scenario’s valuation.

Hence, while I do think that it is possible for BJCORP to attain its fabled 3,000% upside, I want to make it clear that I’m not saying that it is definitely going to happen. While I’m pretty confident about the investment thesis behind the 300% upside, I only believe that this 3,000% upside thesis is just that - a blue-sky scenario investment thesis. It will work in the best of circumstances where all the stars align, but you shouldn’t be counting your chickens on it hatching.

Having said that, we don’t even need this 3,000% upside to materialize in order to justify an investment in BJCORP’s shares today. Remember, the 300% upside thesis is fairly likely to materialize - as I’ve quite clearly demonstrated in Part 1. Furthermore, as I’ve also shown there, there is also very little risk inherent in the investment idea on top of that. Just because we only get a 300% upside and not 3,000% doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t be grinning from ear-to-ear - that’s still a 5-year CAGR of 25%.

However, as we’ll see below, neither does that mean that the potential for a 3,000% upside is unlikely. In fact, I think there’s a pretty decent chance of it, even if it doesn’t actually end up materializing. Like I mentioned earlier, all I’m saying is don’t count your chickens before they hatch. Only expect a 300% upside from this investment - but if you do eventually get the 3,000% upside, consider that a bonus from papa Buffett.

EQUITY
✨ BJCORP and the Mythical 3,000% Upside - Part 4
How BJCORP can potentially challenge Shopee Malaysia for the domestic e-commerce marketplace crown

Aaron Pek
Jan 17

Over the past several equity research reports about BJCORP, we explored the conservative base-case investment thesis for BJCORP with a 300% upside - and performed a deep-dive three statement analysis into the conglomerate.

However, until now we have omitted the low-probability blue-sky scenario investment thesis with a 3,000% upside - which we first discussed in Part 1. However the stratospheric upside warrants that we at least explore its feasibility.

In this report, we shall do some spelunking into how BJCORP could potentially pull together the dizzying array of business assets under its stable to form a credible challenger to the domestic e-commerce arm of SEA Ltd - Shopee Malaysia.

We also perform a cursory valuation analysis which attempts to determine whether attaining a 3,000% upside in this scenario is realistic or not. Spoiler: it is.

In my Part 1 report, we saw how BJCORP’s newly minted CEO Jalil publicly opined in a radio interview that he thought BJCORP’s intrinsic value was worth closer to RM 7.50 per share. The obvious spanner in the works here is that that valuation stands in stark contrast to BJCORP’s current share price of just RM 0.25 per share - implying that there exists a potential 3,000% upside.

Since then, I’ve also been repeatedly hinting at how I thought that one of their listed Berjaya companies SEM (7-11 Malaysia) was the Rosetta Stone under Berjaya’s huge stable of assets which could potentially unlock this magnificent upside. Just to illustrate how colossal a 3,000% upside is, that’s a 222% CAGR even if it took them 10 years to unlock this stratospheric valuation. You could invest $50,000 today and retire a millionaire (post-inflation) after 10 years - without having to lift a finger in between.

In this final conclusion to wrap up our bottomless analysis into BJCORP over the past month, we are going to explore how this mythical otherworldly upside could potentially be achieved.

Summary
With that, we’ve finally brought this bottomless pit of BJCORP’s three statement analysis over the past 10 years to a close. Let’s summarize everything we’ve learned so far in this Part 3c report:

Operating Cash Flows

BJCORP’s OCF has always been positive; however FCF has been consistently negative for most of the past decade. The main reason for their consistently negative FCFs can be traced back to poor profit margins - whether due to disappointing top-line performance or poor operating cost control. Fortunately, this is a turnaround thesis - hence their past performance isn’t necessarily indicative of future performance.

Their Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC) has actually been consistently healthy, largely owing to an above-average levels of Payable Days - which themselves were likely contributed by their BJTOTO and BJFOOD subsidiaries.

Their Cash Conversion Ratio is very volatile - however, this can be mainly attributed to their historical Net Profits being volatile (due to recurring Impairments and Gain on disposals), rather than a deviation between OCF and NP trends.

Investing Cash Flows

Growth CAPEX / Total CAPEX was fairly unsurprising - however, we saw several negative instances of this metric, which implies that they hadn’t reinvested enough maintenance CAPEX to sufficiently maintain the business’s productive capacity in those years.

Most of their material Disposal of operating assets and CAPEX activity over the past decade were related to the corporate exercises that we saw in Part 3b - and are nothing to worry about.

There is one quirky line item called Proceeds from settlement of surrendering certain assets and lease interests to related authorities, amounting to RM 218 mil in FY17. These related to some sort of mysterious corporate development called the “Amat Muhibah Tax Dispute” - luckily, the amounts involved are immaterial.

Financing Cash Flows

BJCORP has been consistently repaying large amounts of debt since 2016 - with average Net debt repayments of RM 500 mil per annum over the past 5 years. This amounts to a staggering debt redemption of 8% of Total Debt (or 5% of Total Equity) per year on average.

This observation allows us guess at what management’s objectives might have been over the past half-decade - which pulls together everything we’ve learned so far from their historical P&L, B/S and CFS of the past 5 years, namely:

high levels of Impairments of Goodwill and Gains on Disposals on subsidiary and associate companies since 2015;

consistently large amounts of Assets of disposal group/Non-current assets classified as held for sale since 2015;

the occasional lack of reinvestment to maintain productive capacity (i.e. Growth CAPEX as % of Total CAPEX);

no Dividends paid to its own shareholders since 2017.

The natural inference that we could draw from these observations is that BJCORP’s management (prior to their new CEO’s entrance this year) had been mainly prioritizing debt repayment over the past half-decade - which appears to have involved downsizing, rather than trying to grow the business.

This might explain why BJCORP’s operational performance over that period was so middling - and perhaps more importantly, implies that their poor historical performance was due to an active choice by management to downsize and reduce debt; rather than due to the business being in uncontrollable secular decline.

If so, it could also provide their new CEO with an easy lever to pull in order to quickly reverse their consistently negative Net Profit performance over the past half-decade - by simply implementing a reallocation of priorities at the conglomerate, both in terms of setting incentives (i.e. KPIs) as well as optimal capital allocation (which we’ve explored in Part 1).

BJCORP has not been paying dividends to its own shareholders for the past half-decade; most of its Dividends paid occurred at the Non-controlling interest level (i.e. dividends paid by their subsidiaries to their shareholders).

Next week, we will at long last be wrapping up this month-long deep-dive analysis of BJCORP in Part 4 - and finally explore how BJCORP might be able to achieve their much-vaunted post-turnaround 3,000% upside.

Now that we have comprehensively explored BJCORP’s financial past, we’re ready to look towards the future - and try to identify what kind of exciting new adventures might await them. In my upcoming Part 4 report, we will do a similar but abridged version of the three statement analysis for all of BJCORP’s relevant Berjaya listed subsidiaries - which together with Part 2, will provide operational context for what their current business capabilities are today; and how they can best reorganize their business assets to exploit the opportunities lying dormant in the Wild West of the post-pandemic Digital New World.

By this time next week, we will at long last gather the entire comprehensive point-of-view that we’ve developed on BJCORP over the past few weeks.....

Summary
With that, we’ve finally brought this bottomless pit of BJCORP’s three statement analysis over the past 10 years to a close. Let’s summarize everything we’ve learned so far in this Part 3c report:

Operating Cash Flows

BJCORP’s OCF has always been positive; however FCF has been consistently negative for most of the past decade. The main reason for their consistently negative FCFs can be traced back to poor profit margins - whether due to disappointing top-line performance or poor operating cost control. Fortunately, this is a turnaround thesis - hence their past performance isn’t necessarily indicative of future performance.

Their Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC) has actually been consistently healthy, largely owing to an above-average levels of Payable Days - which themselves were likely contributed by their BJTOTO and BJFOOD subsidiaries.

Their Cash Conversion Ratio is very volatile - however, this can be mainly attributed to their historical Net Profits being volatile (due to recurring Impairments and Gain on disposals), rather than a deviation between OCF and NP trends.

Investing Cash Flows

Growth CAPEX / Total CAPEX was fairly unsurprising - however, we saw several negative instances of this metric, which implies that they hadn’t reinvested enough maintenance CAPEX to sufficiently maintain the business’s productive capacity in those years.

Most of their material Disposal of operating assets and CAPEX activity over the past decade were related to the corporate exercises that we saw in Part 3b - and are nothing to worry about.

There is one quirky line item called Proceeds from settlement of surrendering certain assets and lease interests to related authorities, amounting to RM 218 mil in FY17. These related to some sort of mysterious corporate development called the “Amat Muhibah Tax Dispute” - luckily, the amounts involved are immaterial.

Financing Cash Flows

BJCORP has been consistently repaying large amounts of debt since 2016 - with average Net debt repayments of RM 500 mil per annum over the past 5 years. This amounts to a staggering debt redemption of 8% of Total Debt (or 5% of Total Equity) per year on average.

This observation allows us guess at what management’s objectives might have been over the past half-decade - which pulls together everything we’ve learned so far from their historical P&L, B/S and CFS of the past 5 years, namely:

high levels of Impairments of Goodwill and Gains on Disposals on subsidiary and associate companies since 2015;

consistently large amounts of Assets of disposal group/Non-current assets classified as held for sale since 2015;

the occasional lack of reinvestment to maintain productive capacity (i.e. Growth CAPEX as % of Total CAPEX);

no Dividends paid to its own shareholders since 2017.

The natural inference that we could draw from these observations is that BJCORP’s management (prior to their new CEO’s entrance this year) had been mainly prioritizing debt repayment over the past half-decade - which appears to have involved downsizing, rather than trying to grow the business.

This might explain why BJCORP’s operational performance over that period was so middling - and perhaps more importantly, implies that their poor historical performance was due to an active choice by management to downsize and reduce debt; rather than due to the business being in uncontrollable secular decline.

If so, it could also provide their new CEO with an easy lever to pull in order to quickly reverse their consistently negative Net Profit performance over the past half-decade - by simply implementing a reallocation of priorities at the conglomerate, both in terms of setting incentives (i.e. KPIs) as well as optimal capital allocation (which we’ve explored in Part 1).

BJCORP has not been paying dividends to its own shareholders for the past half-decade; most of its Dividends paid occurred at the Non-controlling interest level (i.e. dividends paid by their subsidiaries to their shareholders).

Next week, we will at long last be wrapping up this month-long deep-dive analysis of BJCORP in Part 4 - and finally explore how BJCORP might be able to achieve their much-vaunted post-turnaround 3,000% upside.

Now that we have comprehensively explored BJCORP’s financial past, we’re ready to look towards the future - and try to identify what kind of exciting new adventures might await them. In my upcoming Part 4 report, we will do a similar but abridged version of the three statement analysis for all of BJCORP’s relevant Berjaya listed subsidiaries - which together with Part 2, will provide operational context for what their current business capabilities are today; and how they can best reorganize their business assets to exploit the opportunities lying dormant in the Wild West of the post-pandemic Digital New World.

By this time next week, we will at long last gather the entire comprehensive point-of-view that we’ve developed on BJCORP over the past few weeks....

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/aaronpek_bjcorp-accounting-deep-dive-part-3a-activity-6880329805372514304-B9GH

https://www.linkedin.com/posts/aaronpek_bjcorp-accounting-deep-dive-part-3a-activity-6880329805372514304-B9GH

In Part 1 of my BJCORP equity research report (10,000 words), I mentioned how this stock was my favorite ASEAN stock right now - having a base-case scenario with 300% upside, very little downside risk, and built-in optionality for a potential blue-sky scenario with up to 3,000% upside.

Over the past week, I’ve done a deep-dive into both BJCORP’s historical P&L Statements and Balance Sheets over the past 10 years, which you can view by reading Part 3a (4,000 words) and Part 3b (7,000 words) respectively:

In Part 1 of my BJCORP equity research report (10,000 words), I mentioned how this stock was my favorite ASEAN stock right now - having a base-case scenario with 300% upside, very little downside risk, and built-in optionality for a potential blue-sky scenario with up to 3,000% upside.

Over the past week, I’ve done a deep-dive into both BJCORP’s historical P&L Statements and Balance Sheets over the past 10 years, which you can view by reading Part 3a (4,000 words) and Part 3b (7,000 words) respectively:

Investing Cash Flows

Growth CAPEX / Total CAPEX was fairly unsurprising - however, we saw several negative instances of this metric, which implies that they hadn’t reinvested enough maintenance CAPEX to sufficiently maintain the business’s productive capacity in those years.

Most of their material Disposal of operating assets and CAPEX activity over the past decade were related to the corporate exercises that we saw in Part 3b - and are nothing to worry about.

There is one quirky line item called Proceeds from settlement of surrendering certain assets and lease interests to related authorities, amounting to RM 218 mil in FY17. These related to some sort of mysterious corporate development called the “Amat Muhibah Tax Dispute” - luckily, the amounts involved are immaterial.

Financing Cash Flows

BJCORP has been consistently repaying large amounts of debt since 2016 - with average Net debt repayments of RM 500 mil per annum over the past 5 years. This amounts to a staggering debt redemption of 8% of Total Debt (or 5% of Total Equity) per year on average.

This observation allows us guess at what management’s objectives might have been over the past half-decade - which pulls together everything we’ve learned so far from their historical P&L, B/S and CFS of the past 5 years.

The natural inference that we could draw from these observations is that BJCORP’s management (prior to their new CEO’s entrance this year) had been mainly prioritizing debt repayment over the past half-decade - which appears to have involved downsizing, rather than trying to grow the business.

This might explain why BJCORP’s operational performance over that period was so middling - and perhaps more importantly, implies that their poor historical performance was due to an active choice by management to downsize and reduce debt; rather than due to the business being in uncontrollable secular decline.

If so, it could also provide their new CEO with an easy lever to pull in order to quickly reverse their consistently negative Net Profit performance over the psat half-decade - by simply implementing a reallocation of priorities at the conglomerate, both in terms of setting incentives (i.e. KPIs) as well as optimal capital allocation (which we’ve explored in Part 1).

Next week, we will at long last be wrapping up this month-long deep-dive analysis of BJCORP in Part 4 - and finally explore how BJCORP might be able to achieve their much-vaunted post-turnaround 3,000% upside.

EQUITY
✨ BJCORP Accounting Deep-Dive - Part 3c: Cash Flow Statement
Why BJCORP is not a business in secular decline... and how past performance is not indicative of future results

Aaron Pek
Jan 2
2
Happy New Year! This is the 3rd part of a 4-part series to BJCORP Part 3 - which I’ve made free as my New Year’s present to all of you! Click these links to read Part 3a and Part 3b.


Click here to read in browser - emails may not reflect any subsequent editing!
Cash Flow - Definition, Examples, Types of Cash Flows
Summary of this BJCORP Part 3c report (9,000 words):
Operating Cash Flows

BJCORP’s OCF has always been positive; however FCF has been consistently negative for most of the past decade. The main reason for their consistently negative FCFs can be traced back to poor profit margins - whether due to disappointing top-line performance or poor operating cost control. Fortunately, this is a turnaround thesis - hence their past performance isn’t necessarily indicative of future performance.

Their Cash Conversion Cycle (CCC) has actually been consistently healthy, largely owing to an above-average levels of Payable Days - which themselves were likely contributed by their BJTOTO and BJFOOD subsidiaries.

Their Cash Conversion Ratio is very volatile - however, this can be mainly attributed to their historical Net Profits being volatile (due to recurring Impairments and Gain on disposals), rather than a deviation between OCF and NP trends.

BJCORP has not been paying dividends to its own shareholders for the past half-decade; most of its Dividends paid occurred at the Non-controlling interest level (i.e. dividends paid by their subsidiaries to their shareholders).

Use Google to search for "value investing bjcorp part 3" to read full article.

Use Google to search for "value investing bjcorp part 3" to read full article. ..

Why BJCORP is not a business in secular decline... and how past performance is not indicative of future results

Aaron Pek
Jan 2
Happy New Year! This is the 3rd part of a 4-part series to BJCORP Part 3 - which I’ve made free as my New Year’s present to all of you! Click these links to read Part 3a and Part 3b. Use Google to search for latest article by Aaron Pek....

Why BJCORP is not a business in secular decline... and how past performance is not indicative of future results

Aaron Pek
Jan 2
Happy New Year! This is the 3rd part of a 4-part series to BJCORP Part 3 - which I’ve made free as my New Year’s present to all of you! Click these links to read Part 3a and Part 3b. Use Google to search for article by Aaron Pek....

https://www.klsescreener.com/v2/news/view/925421

Use Google Search for: Aaron Pek Value Investing BJCorp for details:

Before we dive headfirst into the investment thesis, I would just like to leave you with something to ruminate over as we pour over the analysis of BJCORP. In mid-July 2021, Jalil gave an interview on the most popular local business radio station BFM. At the 35:24 mark of this interview (Spotify - click here to jump to timestamp), the host asked him point-blank what he thought BJCORP’s shares were worth.

Jalil answered very confidently - between RM 5.00 to RM 10.00, and perhaps closer to RM 10.00. Keep in mind this is a stock which is currently trading at roughly RM 0.25, implying an approximately 30x upside if we assume the lower bound of that range of RM 7.50:

I understand that the potential for conflict of interest exists in his words, but that is just an unnecessarily way-out-there share price target to provide accountability on. In fact, if Jalil was in fact trying to push the stock with that sentence, I’d wager that he actually failed to achieve his objective - by virtue of the fact that people will wonder whether he’s insane. Which means that there is likely some merit to his estimate of BJCORP’s intrinsic value. Also take a look at some recent crazy insider buying activity by BJCORP’s founder Tan Chee Yioun in the above screenshot.

If you want a bit more context behind his estimated target price of RM 7.50, I’d recommend rewinding back to a slightly earlier timestamp of the same interview. At the 34:07 mark, the host provides a summary of the entire interview, which adds a bit more color about why Jalil might think that BJCORP’s shares are worth 30x what they are currently trading at (3,000% upside).

Use Google Search for Aaron Pek Value Investing BJCorp for details:

More from Aaron Pek
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e6f8qX9bRAY

Use Google Search for: Aaron Pek Value Investing BJCorp for details:

Before we dive headfirst into the investment thesis, I would just like to leave you with something to ruminate over as we pour over the analysis of BJCORP. In mid-July 2021, Jalil gave an interview on the most popular local business radio station BFM. At the 35:24 mark of this interview (Spotify - click here to jump to timestamp), the host asked him point-blank what he thought BJCORP’s shares were worth.

Jalil answered very confidently - between RM 5.00 to RM 10.00, and perhaps closer to RM 10.00. Keep in mind this is a stock which is currently trading at roughly RM 0.25, implying an approximately 30x upside if we assume the lower bound of that range of RM 7.50:

I understand that the potential for conflict of interest exists in his words, but that is just an unnecessarily way-out-there share price target to provide accountability on. In fact, if Jalil was in fact trying to push the stock with that sentence, I’d wager that he actually failed to achieve his objective - by virtue of the fact that people will wonder whether he’s insane. Which means that there is likely some merit to his estimate of BJCORP’s intrinsic value. Also take a look at some recent crazy insider buying activity by BJCORP’s founder Tan Chee Yioun in the above screenshot.

If you want a bit more context behind his estimated target price of RM 7.50, I’d recommend rewinding back to a slightly earlier timestamp of the same interview. At the 34:07 mark, the host provides a summary of the entire interview, which adds a bit more color about why Jalil might think that BJCORP’s shares are worth 30x what they are currently trading at (3,000% upside).

Use Google Search for Aaron Pek Value Investing BJCorp for details:

More from Aaron Pek
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e6f8qX9bRAY

BJCorp & BJLand 主要股權結構

BJCorp owns 78.95% BJLand
TSVT owns 4.66% BJLand

BJLand owns 40.5% BToto, 4.97% 7Eleven, 7.98% BAssets, 0.04% Redtone
BJLand owns 40.5% of BToto owns 88.2% BPhilippines, 0.9% BFood

BJCorp & BJLand 主要股權結構

BJCorp owns 78.95% BJLand
TSVT owns 4.66% BJLand

BJLand owns 40.5% BToto, 4.97% 7Eleven, 7.98% BAssets, 0.04% Redtone
BJLand owns 40.5% of BToto owns 88.2% BPhilippines, 0.9% BFood

BJCorp 和 BJLand 公司结构
https://ibb.co/0KW5TSM

BJCorp 和 BJLand 公司结构
https://ibb.co/0KW5TSM