Supersaiyan, just check, u r right. That's good, as it mean aviation stock can go that high too

PE = 15 is too aggressive, SW only 12. Market range from 6 to 12

Oh my god, somebody short AirAsia today.
Probably badly burnt

http://www.bursamalaysia.com/misc/system/equity_market_statistics/securities_equities_rss.pdf

Celaka, I didn't buy since it drop from 2.4, last buy is 2.56.
I really have no luck to bottom price, have time to buy but no money, have money to buy but no time to key order, lol

"On AirAsia realising value in its leasing arm, AAC, Fernandes said the non-binding bids were in and due diligence was being carried out."

Icon, TF said in The Star interview that it's now at due diligence stage.

Nobody shorted AA today?
http://www.bursamalaysia.com/misc/system/equity_market_statistics/securities_equities_rss.pdf

It''s possible that MAA's could be lesser, but that would mean hundred thousands of passenger count go to its associates, it's very significant even to TAA.

57 mil total passenger load is from AirAsia's FB : https://www.facebook.com/AirAsia/photos/a.10154792899782387.1073741965.18801397386/10154792900492387/?type=3&theater

Cruger, this is how I work out 7.25 mil for MAA's 4Q:

Info we know:
1. AirAsia flew 57,263,743 in FY2016.
2. In AirAsia Op Stat for FY2015, we could note that its passenger count include MAA, TAA, IAA, PAA, AAI and IAAX flight on behalf of IAA. It doesn't include MAAX, TAAX and IAAX's own flight.
3. for 9M16, total passenger is 42,087,789. That mean 4Q16's total passenger is at least 15,175,954.
4. In this news at 6 Jan 2017, TAA's CEO project 2016 passenger count is 17 million, deduct away 9M16 4Q16 is around 4.2m passenger.
5. Indonesia AA hasn't introduce any new route or increase frequency of existing route due to negative equity. Seat capacity should be remain the same at around 1.9 mil, 90% load factor is around 1.71 mil.
6. Based on DGCA India data and TF's twitter, 4Q16 load is around 746,929 (=260000+251322+235607)
7. PAA's load in 2Q16 and 3Q16 is around 1m and 0.98 mil. So 4Q16 should be around 1.0 mil too.

Now, 15,175,954 - 4,200,000 - 1,710,000 - 750,000 - 1,000,000 = 7,515,954.

Based on my tracking, in 4Q16 MAA operate 77.5x A320 (76 under MAA operate for full quarter, 1 new addition for MAA at early Nov, 1 wet lease from IAA) and 1.5x A330 (wet leased from IAAX). This translate to around 7,786,726 seat in 4Q (it will be to complicate to explain how I come out to this number, so i just skip).
In MIDF's paper, they say MAA load factor for Oct & Nov is 93%. Assume Dec also 93%, then passenger load would be 0.93 * 7,786,726 = 7,241,655. quite close to 7.5 millions we get above.

Source:
1.TAA's CEO projection : http://www.bangkokpost.com/business/tourism-and-transport/1175097/network-expansion-to-fuel-taas-2017-growth
2. DGCA India statistic for Oct & Nov : http://dgca.nic.in/pub/month-stats/2016/airasia16.pdf
3. TF's twitter about AAI's Dec Load : https://twitter.com/tonyfernandes/status/817606891077369856
2.PLF : http://klse.i3investor.com/blogs/kianweiaritcles/112552.jsp

That's why don't easily trust research house, including Calvin Tan Research house XD

VietJet, an airline with 36 aircrafts, valued at USD 1.2b, while AirAsia, an airlines group with 170 aircrafts valued at USD 1.65b?

http://klse.i3investor.com/blogs/kianweiaritcles/113496.jsp

Cruger, I am expecting 7.25 mil passenger for Q4

Wouldn't be entirely wiped out, the worst case forex loss is 300 mil.
But could have some surprise there. Forward foreign currencies contract and cash flow hedge may kick in.

Supersaiyan3, I am looking at minimum 600 million operating profit sand 500 millions net operating profit.

Airasia saw the third highest net money inflow of RM2.70m but its share price underperformed with a -3.06% loss during the review week arguably in reaction to a rating cut (from hold to sell) by a major foreign bank alluding to weaker ringgit, higher jet fuel prices and pressure on yields.

http://www.thestar.com.my/business/business-news/2017/01/09/foreign-funds-net-buyers-in-week-ended-jan-6/

Yield is still better measure than RASK, as RASK include non-core revenue like lease income (which is significant for MAA and most of it will remove after AAC disposal.) the downside of yield is it doesn't include ancillary income, so we just have to include it in yield to complete the picture.

Seem like AirAsia India have a very good result for 4Q16.
Not sure if could turn into profit, but quite likely lesser loss than 4Q15.

https://twitter.com/tonyfernandes/status/817606891077369856

Very good writing, thank you

After looking at DB's paper, I look into my model, assume (i)USDMYR 4.60, (ii) oil price hiking from 65 in Q1 and to 80 in Q4, (iii)Assume only 2% grow in traffic, (iv)~RM4 drop in base fare, and (v) associates contribution in 4Q17 is net loss of 15 mil (i really doubt the condition for FY2017 will be so bad)
My 8xPE for AirAsia is still RM2.17. either something really wrong with my model, or that DB guy

I don't know, I am not that shorties XD

Look at how much shorties have to borrow share to short sell yesterday to bring down the price

http://www.bursamalaysia.com/misc/system/equity_market_statistics/securities_equities_rss.pdf

now we have confirmation of who BusinessFinance is

There is big selling, but not necessarily big sellers.
Later i can take a look on Bloomberg terminal on foreign ownership if I have time.

Supermx2, it isn't you put money in USD stocks then you are safe. Make sure its revenue isnt record in other currency but report in USD.

When you point out that many are biased toward this aviation stock, you are also very biased toward this capital intense industry. High capital outflow and no guarantee of stable profit, this is why market see it as a sub-ten P/E sector. While there is a lot of risk involve, the share price itself has discounted a lot of risk, which you refuse to see. While airlines make their huge order to allow for lower capital cost per aircraft, to allow for lower monthly expenses and could save more fuel when using new aircrafts (whether new or old model),, you call it as unreasonable high debt without looking at total saving in the process. When airlines sell and lease back their aircrafts (bought on discount) for one time gain and debt clearing, you refuse to see this industry norm's benefit and simply call it as lack of financial muscle. When airline expands in order to survive in this get bigger or die small (FuXing airline, Kingfisher, American Airways and many more), you call this unrealistic expansion without seeing the need of this. You look at correlation between debt and stock price and call this high risk stock, you failed to see it's a very efficient stock in EMH theory due to its high foreign ownership.
If you are looking for risk-free income, then you shouldn't look at this industry.

https://business.inquirer.net/222434/airasia-ph-wants-flights-india

http://thestandard.com.ph/business/225769/ph-air-asia-readies-flights-to-new-delhi.html

Very odd news. A route with 4759km distance, fall under AAX's operation range, although within range of A320neo...

AirAsia's fleet size (Planned vs Actual)
Year : Actual vs Planned in 2011:
2011 : +06 vs +07
2012 : +22 vs +14
2013 : +32 vs +13
2014 : +18 vs +18
2015 : -01 vs +19
2016 : +02 vs +19
Total : +85 vs +90

Miss out by 5 aircrafts, probably due to selling of 5 aircrafts in Q2 (9M-AJU) and Q3 (9M-AJL, 9M-AJO, 9M-AJQ, 9M-AJU)

Anyway, we are too deep into the fuel economy topic, which help little in analyses AirAsia.

Cruger, I can't found the slide I read previously, but key concept is like this:
1. Assume service lifecycle, total payload, cruising speed of aircraft and sector length are same for both A320neo and A320ceo.
2. we compare the extra expense in capital cost (aircraft puchase) and compare with total operation saving throughout the life cycle (fuel saving x fuel price) to find out total number, and further minus away the extra maintenance cost (since newer aircrafts has higher technology and more expensive, there should be extra expense in maintenance). We could arrive in whether there is any saving.
3. Alternatively, assume extra capital cost & fuel saving both at 15%, we compare the ratio of (Capital + Maintenance cost) : (Operation cost), If C+M is bigger than O, then there will be no saving, and vice versa. If I am not wrong, C+M:O = 1:1 when fuel price is around USD 80.

Anyway, as AirAsia operate at daily block hour of more than 10 hour, the fuel saving will be more significant than others.
Not sure if lesser fuel burn = lesser maintenance.

Cruger, tonight I can show you Airbus slide about the fuel saving. 15% is total saving per trip, per seat cost is even lower.

Another significant advantage is it can fly 15% longer.
Same with A330neo ordered by AAX, that's why now AAX can't fly to London now but can go to London in 2018

JN88, yes but A320neo is also 15% more expansive. There is no saving until fuel price hit USD80/barrel

rMoi, the 5 ideal aircrafts are sold and now in China

R3D3, the truth is you show you don't know about Airbus when you say AirAsia forced to take delivery. The annual capacity of Airbus for single aisle aircraft is 550, after finish of ramp up at end of this year, and their backlog is 5460. Which mean if you order A320 today, the earliest you can get is 2020, if other airlines still undecided on their delivery schedule. Else, you have to wait until 2026. The issue for Airbus now is they couldn't meet the demand of customer, why would they force AirAsia to take delivery? You sound like Airbus is running out of demand and must force customer to take delivery on time.

Another thing is, based on latest delivery schedule before Dec2016, the agreed delivery for 2017 is just 5/6 aircrafts. Your statement is far from truth.

JN88, 15%

AirAsia forced to take delivery? You mean they take because they must to and not because they want to? Friend, you know nothing about Airbus and know nothing about changes to aircraft delivery schedule.

R3D3, you are right about share price. The only odd for past 10 years are GMT report.
Aircrafts delivery is for 10 years, not 20 years.

Icon, unlikely for new TAA's aircrafts as those are under financial lease.

R3, I have to say that AirAsia is my most aggressive investment, consider it drop to 0.8 level in 2015. However, I protect myself with huge margin of safety, that's why I still making awesome 20% return for last year despite AirAsia drop 30% from peak. For my other stock, most of them are very defensive stock with sound fundamental like staple, bank & etc, also with sufficient margin of safety.
For AirAsia, it wouldn't melt down in 1 quarter, but with AAC's dividend & 20% of FY2016 net profit dividend incoming, it's a calculated move for me. Risky but worth it.

hit 60% at mid year but drop back to 23% to end 2016

既然提出了8個名字，為何不提出各自的supporting detail呢？

R3D3, the point of having discussion is to understand each side of story and hence know more about a stock, this is what I believe. I agree with your last statement, it's dangerous to fall in love or hate a stock. Since for you whatever I said is just to "prove to you" and just that "I am fall in love with a stock" instead of see it as having a healthy discussion, then better I just keep quiet . Thank you for insulting my investing intelligent and wish you have a good 2017 investment result.

Thank you R3D3, now I learned another things about AirAsia.

R3D3, for total fleets number better deduct away 2 to third parties, as it's negligible and non-core business. That 28 number doesn't include those to AAX, as AirAsia & AAX has different order and belong to 2 stocks. We should only discuss about AAX when we talk about marketing and strategy.

Let look at historical number for last few years (at year end, exclude third party):
Year : #acft (+##,+##%) (net gearing)(cash on hand - RM)
2006 : 054 (base) (1.56, 2005 = 0.60)(412.9 mil)
2007 : 065 (+11, +20%) ______(4.02) ___ ( 574.3 mil)
2008 : 076 (+11, +17%) ______(2.62) ___ ( 120.8 mil)
2009 : 084 (+08, +11%) ______(1.74) ___ ( 718.5 mil)
2010 : 090 (+06, +7%) ______ (1.41) __ _(1475.8 mil)
2011 : 096 (+06, +7%) _______(1.27) ___(2092.6 mil)
2012 : 118 (+22, +23%) ______(1.76) ___(2219.2 mil)
2013 : 154 (+36, +31%) ______(2.50) __ (1194.5 mil)
2014 : 172 (+18, +12%) ______(2.29) ___( 768.4 mil)
2015 : 171 (-01, -1%) ______ _ (1.84) _ _(2426.7 mil)
2016 : 174 (+04, +2%) _______(1.47) _ _ (1533.6 mil) [net gearing & cash in end 3Q16]
2017 : 202 (+28, +16%)

From above we could see that this year addition is 2nd highest numerically and 5th highest geometrically. If we just look at fleet size alone, we would note a simple pattern of 3 years aggresive expansion period (addition >10%) follow by 2 years of slowing down (addition <10%) happened for twice. The most aggresive expansion period are 2012 to 2014 while slowest expansion period is 2015-2016.

(I include net gearing on above, as net gearing = (total borrowing - cash)/total equity, therefore the effect of "doubtful asset (amount due from associates)" is excluded in numerator. RPT still have effect on denominator of net gearing, you could multiple net gearing for 2015 & 2016 by 1.2 to eliminate effect of ADFA asset if you wish to.)

Now let look at net gearing for each year after aircrafts addition. We could see that AirAsia "overstretched" its financial muscle for 3 years pre-financial crisis and didn't die, net gearing drop from 4.02 pre-crisis to 2.62 post-crisis, and further reduce to 1.27 at end of 2 years resting period. At 2012, AirAsia restarted 3 years aggressive expansion and end the MAS-MAA blood war at 2014 with 2.29. The second resting period (or probably we should call ICU period as net increase is just 2 aircrafts) last for 2 years during which Ringgit tumble by 50% and cruel oil price drop to lowest of USD 29/barrel. Net gearing drop to 1.47 in last quarter.

Now we look at cash in hand for each year, quite straight forward, AirAsia use up most of cash at end of expansion and re-charge during resting period. The only exception is this time some money are used for repayment of borrowing to reduce risk from Ringgit tumbling. This could explain why private placement is needed, more cash need to be raised for next aggresive expansion.

Come to this point, I believe I have provide my answer for your question on AirAsia's financial muscle.

Sidenote:
1. From last presentation, we know AirAsia hedge 47% of aircraft purchase to USD:MYR 3.235, 33% unhedge and 20% natural hedge, so effect of Ringgit tumbling is actually not as big as we think. Of course, whether could accept or not is depend on everyone.

Consolation for AirAsia: Total seats in fleets are 42300, slightly more than Lion Air's 39840.

Interest fact: Lion Air has 2 Boeing 747 in their fleet. Hopefully one day AirAsia could own some A380neo for flight to American mainland, if Airbus decide to build one.

R3D3, not sure if you know AirAsia + AirAsia X is no longer largest LCC group in Asia?

Lion Air Group's LCCs has 189 aircrafts to date and Lion Air Group's hybrids (Malindo & Batik Air) has 83 aircrafts to date, while AirAsia only have 194 aircrafts to date. AirAsia need to expand now to catch up to Lion Air Group. You see 28 aircrafts as too much but I would say it's too little to late.

Lion Air Group:
5 wide bodies (A330 + B747)
209 narrow bodies Jet (A320 + B737)
58 Turboprop (ATR72)

AirAsia + AirAsia X Group:
30 wide bodies (A330)
172 narrow bodies Jet (A320)

Trailing Twelve month free cash flow (Net Op cash - capital expenditure, not consider proceeds from disposal) of AirAsia is RM 300 million, which they could either use for repayment of borrowing or for more aircraft addition. TTM operating cashflow is RM1.2 billion,

Note that AirAsia first ordered A320neo in 2011, so price of aircraft will follow that year instead of latest price. The list price for 2012 above will be higher but that the earliest number i could find in Airbus website.