First of all, I would like to allocate due credit to paperplane2016 and MoneySifu for bringing up this company to the public attention. Under its Singaporean holding entity, Malaysia Smelting Corporation is an integrated tin-based corporation that recently underwent some management restructuring. Although the past couple of years have fed the company with an immense amount of pessimism due to all their impairment losses abroad, the resignation of their previous CEO and the downfall of tin price, things may turn brighter again. As this piece of mine may be long, I would like to express gratitute to those who offer their time for it and please feel free to provide constructive feedbacks.
Company Introduction
Malaysia Smelting Corporation's main business activities take place in their plant located in Butterworth with a production capacity of approximately 40000 tonnes a year using reverbatory furnace technology. As refined tin metal may be sold to end-user customers or traded on the international commodity markets, there is a ready market in terms of the latter for refined tin metal so the selling margin is significantly influenced by what is commanded in this market. This is a double edged sword as it means the company's pricing power may not be exceptionally huge but at the same time, they do not compete for customers (more relevant for international commodity markets). On the other hand, they compete on the basis of having access to supplies of tin concentrates from third party suppliers so tin mining business is likely to have more pricing power especially in the face of depleting ore reserves globally. Fortunately, the company also operates their own mining business through Rahman Hydraulic Tin and the lease for the mining site expires in 2019 and it is likely that they will be able to extend the license until the depletion of the tin ore resources (Malaysia la). Besides that, the company has a 40% ownership in Redring Solder with the principal activities of manufacturing and sale of solder products for jointing and semiconductor applications in the electrical and electronic industries.
Since Malaysia Smelting Corporation https://klse.i3investor.com/servlets/stk/5916.jsp is involved in both the downstream value-added smelting process and upstream tin mining process, the following highlights the core competencies and weaknesses of both their business as a whole.
Core Competency:
Core Weaknesses:
Risks of mining operation:
Capacity and Output
Years | Concentrates (tonnes) | Midstream (tonnes) |
2016 | 2228 | 26802 |
2015 | 2196 | 30209 |
2014 | 2238 | 34971 |
2013 | 2223 | 32668 |
2012 | 2179 | 37792 |
2011 | 2010 | 40267 |
2010 | 1769 | 38737 |
Industry Overview
Based on information from ITRI, tin products are commonly used in the following applications:
As Malaysia Smelting Corporation's performance is highly correlated to the performance of tin, a study of tin prospects are presented below.
With depleting reserves in many major countries while no major discovery of news mine ongoing, it is rather surprising that tin price performance up until now even if one looks from the point of 2009 is less than the growth of of semiconductor sales although this is a scarce resources.
Declining London Metal Exchange inventory over a decade. Basically, LME inventory data is based on LME-approved warehouses (about 700 approved warehouses across the USA, Europe and Asia)that stores tin on behalf of warrant holders.
As shown above, tin ore and refined tin production's increment reduced since 2005 while the graph on the right presents the surplus or deficit of refined tin globally. Sure enough, a deficit incurred most of the time from 1995 to 2017 (still in deficit now) and this deficit is expected to be worse due to declining supply (declining grade of tin ores, depletion of reserves) and increasing consumption (semiconductor, batteries and etc.).
Although China's production of refined tin has been increasing recently, the increase has been significantly fueled by their increase in tin concentrate purchase from Myanmar's tin mining operations. However, this advantage is likely to be phased out (Google has plenty of articles on Myanmar's tin ore depletion and grade decline) soon. Since Malaysia is a small player in the global tin market in terms of tin ore production and refined tin production, it is normal that this sector receives less attention and may have caused some pricing inefficiencies.
Aside from China, most major producers of tin ores are exhibiting a downtrend in production volume although I have no idea if this is a sustainable decline. One thing for sure is that the grade of tin mines is declining generally which makes extraction rate lower. By the way, Rahman Hydraulic Tin Mining is market leader in production of tin ore in Malaysia because they produced 2228 tonnes while Malaysia as a whole produced 4123 tonnes.
As mentioned, tin mine reserves are generally declining and only Indonesia demonstrated a slight increase in tin mine reserves. Until significant players start discovering new mines, the prospective supply should remain tight and support prices well.
With these circumstances present, I personally have an optimistic idea about the tin market barring a global recession. However, please feel free to come up with your own perspective based on the data provided above.
Historical Performance
Whenever a free cash flow projection is required, I tend to refer to history not because I believe history will repeat itself but it gives me a clue on the general operational performance of the company. Subsequently, a simple comparison with competitors is done to ensure the credibility of the understanding and finally, a projection is carried out based on available catalyst, reversion from historical pattern and due prudence from conservatism. Below is Malaysia Smelting Corporation's historical performance and I chose to use Adjusted EBIT that stripped out one-off transactions, dirty surpluses and etc. to arrive at core operational performance.
Year | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 |
Revenue | 2738834 | 3098551 | 2328688 | 1591980 | 1915179 | 1464855 | 1477941 |
YoY % | 13.13% | -24.85% | -31.64% | 20.30% | -23.51% | 0.89% |
Gross Profit margin (%) | 8.22% | 9.21% | 3.46% | 10.91% | 7.65% | 9.31% | 11.08% |
Adjusted EBIT margin (%) | 2.56% | 4.21% | -2.44% | 6.82% | 3.80% | 4.93% | 6.15% |
Tin price in RM | 65418.8 | 79637.91 | 64931.28 | 70633.94 | 71850.62 | 63139.38 | 74543 |
Property, plant and equipment | 94523 | 92378 | 79210 | 82521 | 88465 | 98893 | 154615 |
Investment in associates | 148539 | 174181 | 162103 | 107426 | 71318 | 84469 | 37336 |
NWC as a proportion of revenue | 18.87% | 13.98% | 11.42% | 15.47% | 14.45% | 12.16% | 18.73% |
CAPEX over Revenue | -2.32% | -1.76% | -0.93% | -0.50% | -0.74% | -0.52% | -3.88% |
Net debt | 581796 | 327756 | 298096 | 264329 | 222818 | 258175 | 259078 |
As observed above, the revenue of Malaysia Smelting Corporation has been declining which may point to a mean reversion from 2017 onwards. Despite the decline in revenue, adjusted EBIT margin actually increased which contrast the picture painted by the annual reports with all the impairment expenses included. A particularly encouraging thing that I noted is the decline in investment in associates (all their diversification around the whole of Asia back then among different commodities) while the focus in the business core operation through capital expenditure into its property, plant and equipment is back on track. Similarly, the net debt in the company declined despite the huge requirement of working capital within this industry. Sure enough, the difficulty in projection for this company lies in its volatile capital expenditure and net working capital changes.
Free Cash Flow Projection
Year | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
Revenue | 1670073.33 | 1887183 | 2132517 | 2409744 | 2723010 |
EBIT margin | 6.50% | 6.50% | 6.50% | 6.50% | 6.50% |
EBITDA after tax | 99382.6848 | 112797.5 | 127956.3 | 145085.8 | 164442.1 |
CAPEX | -25051.1 | -28307.7 | -31987.7 | -36146.2 | -40845.2 |
Increase in NWC | 30450.53 | 33800.09 | 37518.1 | 41645.09 | 46226.05 |
FCFF | 43881.0549 | 50689.72 | 58450.5 | 67294.54 | 77370.85 | 906448.6 |
Discount factor | 1.09 | 1.1881 | 1.295029 | 1.411582 | 1.538624 | 1.6771 |
IV per share net of debt | 5.07423436 |
Assumptions:
At the price of RM3.92, the intrinsic value of RM5.07 provides approximately 23% margin-of-safety.
Peer Comparisons
Although Malaysia Smelting Corporation cited Yunnan Tin Group as their major competitor, the business structure of both entity are significantly different in recent years. Additionally, I chosed Indonesia's PT Timah as a peer due to geographical proximity and market similarity although both Yunnan Tin Group and PT Timah's business structure are not entirely representative of Malaysia Smelting Corporation.
Revenue Structure
Yunnan Tin Group | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 |
Copper | 0.00% | 18.00% | 39.00% | 57.00% | 62.00% | 58.00% |
Tin | 83.00% | 68.00% | 53.00% | 32.00% | 28.00% | 27.00% |
PT Tin Group on the other hand is generating approximately 95% of their revenue from tin products (way more emphasis on tin mining than smelting) while MSC is what we already know.
EBIT Margin
2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 |
YTG | 9.40% | 3.88% | -4.50% | 4.10% | -1.99% | 3.78% |
MSC | 4.21% | -2.44% | 6.82% | 3.80% | 4.93% | 6.15% |
PTTimah | 15.06% | 8.73% | 14.17% | 12.81% | 1.19% | 7.14% |
As PT Timah is heavily involved in tin mining, their margin is higher as mentioned initially that the mining segment has more pricing power. Based on the latest 2016 annual report revenue figures in Ringgit translated term, Yunnan Tin Group's annual revenue is around RM21 billion with a market capital of RM13 billion while PT Timah has annual revenue of RM2.5 billion with a market capital of RM1.8 billion. This compares to Malaysia Smelting Corporation's revenue of RM1.5 billion with a market capital of RM400 million. In terms of growth potential, Malaysia Smelting Corporation is more likely to have it than the other two due to a lower revenue base.
Multiples (Earnings based on EBIT)
Multiples | MSC | YTG | PTTimah |
EBIT / EV | 13.95% | 3.67% | 11.25% |
EV / EBIT | 7.2 | 27.2 | 8.9 |
CFFO / Market cap | 20.74% | 5.65% | 17.52% |
Market Cap / CFFO | 4.82 | 17.70 | 5.71 |
Since the revenue contribution from tin products for Yunnan Tin Group fell recently, I decided to focus comparing MSC to PTTimah. PTTimah is a largely state-owned enterprise from Indonesia and they are more focused on upstream activities in contrast to MSC's focus on midstream and downstream activity. Despite higher interest rate in Indonesia than Malaysia, PTTimah is getting a more generous valuation on its multiples despite MSC having a stronger growth prospect currently due to all the effort in place. Assuming MSC gets the same EV / EBIT multiple PTTimah is getting, that represents a price of RM5.50. CFFO is used instead of FCFF to determine cash yield because of the volatility in capital expenditure for this industry as a whole. If we compare using the cash yield, MSC at PTTimah's valuation must be at least RM4.70.
Investment Highlights
Risks
Shareholding Structure
For more information on this, please refer to the article written by paperplane2016 at https://klse.i3investor.com/blogs/moneymoney/108898.jsp Based on transaction data, both prominent investors are still holding their stake in the company. With a low proportion of floating shares, any immediate catalyst may influence price significantly. These investors definitely have way more access to information than retailers so their position may be telling.
Conclusion
Given the relevance of the core competencies of the company in the current business environment coupled with major catalyst at hand, the business potential is likely to be assymmetrical assuming the major risks highlighted do not materialize in a disruptive way. A value arbitrage with reference to Ringgit Tin Price, Malaysian semiconductor players and other tin players? As the lack of dividend payment became one of the reason for undervaluation, this may change as the company recently started paying dividend again. This is not an investment recommendation but merely my personal opinion with very heavy sense of conservatism.
Please feel free to provide feedbacks for me to improve my writings further.
Note:
Based on data stretching all the way back to 1990, a linear regression model (non-spurious due to randomnity of residuals) showed that a 1% increase in revenue for the company corresponds to an average increase of 0.6% in net working capital. While some may think data that far away may deemed obsolete, shorter time frames of about 17 years provided similar results. Whatever it is, the assumption that NWC grows at 11% when revenue is growing at 13% already incorporates adequate conservatism unless the management is just very incompetent.
Created by Artemis | Aug 03, 2017
Created by Artemis | Aug 01, 2017
this article for your reference as well - http://www.theedgemarkets.com/article/topbrass-change-part-revamp-%E2%80%94-malaysia-smelting
2017-07-24 23:22
John Lu
Good
2017-07-22 17:38