The US has tightened export controls on quantum computing and semiconductor technology to address national defense and foreign policy concerns posed by foes including China, Iran, and Russia.

The Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) on Thursday published an interim final rule (IFR) in the Federal Register describing the restrictions, which apply worldwide and are intended to fit with similar export restrictions from like-minded governments.

The IFR [PDF] covers: Quantum computing, related components, and software; advanced semiconductor manufacturing; Gate All-Around Field-Effect Transistor (GAAFET) technology that’s used to develop high-performance chips for supercomputers and other high-end gear; and additive manufacturing tools designed to fabricate metal or metal alloy components.

"Today’s action ensures our national export controls keep step with rapidly evolving technologies and are more effective when we work in concert with international partners," said Alan Estevez, under secretary for the Bureau of Industry and Security, in a statement.

"Aligning our controls on quantum and other advanced technologies makes it significantly more difficult for our adversaries to develop and deploy these technologies in ways that threaten our collective security."

What's changed?

The rules add new Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) to the Commerce Control List, covering general product categories and capabilities rather than specific products.

For example, the new ECCN B910 specifies kit related to alloy manufacturing, as those substances are used to produce parts for missiles, aircraft, and propulsion systems. Another new ECCN is "3A904 Cryogenic cooling systems and components," which focuses on "items that are relevant for research on quantum systems with a larger quantity of physical qubits."

The rules add 18 ECCNs and update 9 existing ECCNs.

A 2023 Congressional Research Service report [PDF] observed that coordinating export controls with other governments is essential to ensure such efforts are impactful.

"Coordination may be critical to the effectiveness of a policy aimed at preventing or delaying the foreign acquisition of certain goods or technology," the report says. "Such controls may be less effective if the goods or technologies are readily available from foreign sources."

For example, US government efforts in 2019 to limit the technology available to Chinese telecoms manufacturer Huawei by placing the company and 114 affiliates proved less effective than hoped without coordination from international partners. As a result, BIS expanded its sanctions the following year.

Lately, the lesson that allies are needed appears to have been taken to heart. In 2022, the Commerce Department's BIS announced [PDF] new export controls aimed at curbing China's access to advanced semiconductor technology, following more targeted sanctions on specific Chinese companies two years earlier.

In 2023, the US, Japan, and The Netherlands - three leading chipmaking countries - agreed to coordinate efforts to withhold sophisticated chip tech from China.

The latest BIS export controls appear to be further examples of international cooperation.

"The most effective way to protect our national security is to develop and coordinate our controls alongside like-minded partners, and today’s actions demonstrate our flexibility in how we craft such controls to achieve our national security objective,” said assistant secretary of commerce for export administration Thea D. Rozman Kendler, in a statement, adding that a license exception is available to trusted partners.

A paper [PDF] published last month from academics at Fudan University in China and Harvard Business School, "The Consequences of Export Controls in Target Countries," found that in the case of the 2007 US "China rule" policy, which limited Chinese imports of products with military applications, export controls were effective and restricted the supply of controlled goods to sanctioned Chinese firms.

However a February 2024 report on the subject from the Center for Strategic and International Studies paints more of a nuanced picture, citing economic costs for the US and opportunities for China.

"The success of US controls is likely to depend on the ability to harmonize US restrictions with those of key allies, whose export controls differ substantially from those of the United States, resulting in substantial gaps," the CSIS report says. "In general, US allies have a narrower scope for restrictions." ®

https://www.theregister.com//2024/09/06/us_rolls_out_new_export/