COASTAL

FISCAL YEAR ENDING 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019
PRICE 1.50 2.47 1.37 0.69 1.32

MARKET CAP (MILLION) 828.04 1,311.93 718.63 364.59 696.27
NAPS (BV) 3.30 2.56 2.11 2.06 2.23
EPS 0.70 0.34 0.06 -0.20 0.03

ROE 21.07% 13.26% 2.93% -9.67% 1.22%
ROA 18.18% 8.94% 2.31% -6.75% 0.87%
P/B 0.45 0.97 0.65 0.34 0.59
P/E 2.16 7.28 22.20 -3.47 48.31
EARNINGS YIELD 46.38% 13.74% 4.51% -28.81% 2.07%
FCF YIELD 19.28% 4.93% -7.63% 9.91% 23.23%
DIVIDEND YIELD 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%

Fiscal year is July-June. All values MYR Millions. 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019
TOTAL EQUITY 1,823 1,359 1,105 1,086 1,177
TOTAL ASSET 2,112 2,016 1,399 1,556 1,648

CASH AND EQUIVALENT 185 239 275 524 503
ST DEBT & CURRENT PORTION OF LT DEBT 45 344 44 242 63
LT DEBT 43 120 50 35 231
TOTAL DEBT 88 464 94 277 294
NET CASH (DEBT) 97 -225 181 247 209

ACCOUNT RECEIVABLE 1,056 784 192 166 177
ACCOUNT PAYABLE 149 141 135 136 130



Balance Sheet is surprisingly strong.

>>>

Stock: [YINSON]: YINSON HOLDINGS BHD

1 day ago | Report Abuse

Fiscal year is February-January. All values MYR Millions. 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019
ACCOUNT RECEIVABLE 1,023 644 575 548 433
ACCOUNT PAYABLE 462 202 178 148 113

Long-Term Note Receivable 10,334 6,688 4,405 1,501 15


[Often, a business will allow customers to convert their overdue accounts (the business’ accounts receivable) into notes receivable. By doing so, the debtor typically benefits by having more time to pay.]

>>>>


Can someone help dissecting the > 10b long term notes receivables?

Who is the sifu?

3 types of companies: Gruesome, Good and Great

Padini falls into my category of a great company.
Consistent and growing earnings.
Good gross profit margins and net profit margins.
Healthy earnings that translate into a lot of cash from operations.
Generates a lot of FCF.
Paying dividends (DP0 over the 5 years was 0.42)
Capex is < 25% of its net earnings.

FISCAL YEAR ENDING 2023
PRICE 3.44

MARKET CAP (MILLION) 2,263.52

ROE 21.44%
ROA 13.39%
P/B 2.18
P/E 10.15
EARNINGS YIELD 9.85%
DIVIDEND YIELD 3.34%

Fiscal year is July-June.
All values MYR Millions. 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019
CASH AND EQUIVALENT 605 809 524 441 472
ST DEBT & CURRENT PORTION OF LT DEBT 94 74 76 91 21
LT DEBT 367 318 317 432 2
TOTAL DEBT 461 392 393 523 23
NET CASH (DEBT) 144 417 131 -82 449

ACCOUNT RECEIVABLE 40 40 48 42 52
ACCOUNT PAYABLE 92 127 38 58 102

Fiscal year 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019
NET PROFIT MARGIN 12.24% 11.68% 5.25% 5.54% 8.97%
ASSET TURNOVER 1.09 0.88 0.81 0.97 1.87
FINANCIAL LEVERAGE 1.60 1.68 1.59 1.83 1.29
ROA 13.39% 10.31% 4.24% 5.36% 16.74%
ROE 21.44% 17.28% 6.73% 9.79% 21.62%

Fiscal year is July-June. All values MYR Thousands. 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019
Funds from Operations 364,969.00 297,312.00 168,008.00 242,850.00 208,694.00
Changes in Working Capital -367,371.00 187,628.00 25,801.00 -79,349.00 -72,200.00
Inventories -304,480.00 80,481.00 53,701.00 -8,897.00 -28,669.00

PADINI 20.4.2024

Fiscal year is July-June. All values MYR Millions. 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019
TOTAL EQUITY (Book Value) 1,040.00 891.00 802.00 766.00 740.00
TOTAL ASSET 1,666.00 1,494.00 1,274.00 1,398.00 956.00

Fiscal year is July-June. All values MYR Millions. 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019
NET INCOME 223 154 54 75 160
NOSH (DILUTED) 658 658 658 658 658

Fiscal year is July-June. All values MYR Thousands. 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019
FREE CASH FLOW -28,870 469,249 188,795 152,158 109,611
DIVIDENDS -75,660 -65,791 -16,448 -49,343 -75,660

DPO RATIO 0.34 0.43 0.30 0.66 0.47

>>>
Posted by Sslee > 1 minute ago | Report Abuse

Is 3iii implied Tong of theedgemalaysia who started this round of Insas spike up is the only one who has this tremendous insight that this stock is cheap and all the other people who are very active, smart and intelligent (3iii included) in the market are ignoring this company because of their ignorance or ego or prejudice or they are not smart enough?
>>>


SSLee
Your interpretation is absolutely off the mark.
It is a general remark. Ask the right questions. The first question to ask when you find an extremely undervalued stock is obvious. Why is it so undervalued?

Is Parkson undervalued? I think its P/B is even lower. But then, many can give a lot of reasons why it should be so.

It is a check list to guide one on deciding whether this is a value trap or not a value trap. A very general, generic statement.

If they had identified Padini then, they would have a multi-bagger (5x to 6x) and all its dividends.
There is always an opportunity cost to every decision.
No right or wrong. Just trying to understand how we make decisions guided by our internal schema.
Read Think fast and think slow by Kahneman, an excellent book on understanding the process of thinking.

I believe many deep value investors in Insas in i3 bought when they were active participants in INVESTLAH FORUM. How many years have passed by?

P/B 0.27

So, when full value is realised, the investor gained 4 folds. When will this be realised? How much will be the gain (also uncertain)? These are among the limitations of deep value investing. OTOH, these bargains, by nature of their business, are less likely to grow into multi-baggers.

FISCAL YEAR ENDING 2023
PRICE 1.00

MARKET CAP (MILLION) 663.02

ROE 4.91%
ROA 4.05%
P/B 0.27
P/E 5.40
EARNINGS YIELD 18.51%
DIVIDEND YIELD 2.50%


Some investors are attracted to this stock because it is so undervalued. Yes, it is undervalued and they are right.

VALUE TRAPS
How do you decide whether it is a value trap or not?

Value traps are statistically very cheap and very alluring.

First question to ask: “Why is God so kind on you that you are the only one who has this tremendous insight that this stock is cheap and all the other people who are very active, smart and intelligent in the market are ignoring this company?”

Is there an embedded growth optionality in the company? Can the company have a growth phase? Can the company come out with some new product offering which can introduce growth?

This is a dynamic exercise. You will need to revisit the hypothesis every now and again, at intervals.

Two characteristics of value traps are:

(1) They typically don’t tend to grow more than the nominal GDP
(2) They cannot reinvest their cash flow.

So the question you should ask is what is the catalyst which will change this and allow them to reinvest the capital which they are throwing off? In its absence, you have a classic example where the company had great cash flows and no catalyst.

Your sole focus of whether to participate in a seemingly value trap could be you calling out the catalyst that will catapult it out of this situation.

Thanks for sharing. This is the sort of discussion that will benefit this forum. Not the type that I had with a Singaporean.

This allows us to see the various views of different investors. Also, presenting the fundamentals and the narratives related to these fundamentals highlighted the important facts needed for one to make an intelligent decision.

We invest in different styles. Thus, it is alright to differ in opinions. You are right from your own perspectives. Afterall, it is your money and your decision is the one that matters.

Thanks for sharing. Fragility of the business environment is an issue I look at too in investing.

In some listed company, the insiders make more money from the fluctuations of the share prices than from the business profits and dividends.

>>>
Sslee

Is 3iii saying those buying capA must be mad and silly gambler?

>>>

Games people play. These are: positive sum games, negative sum games and zero sum games. Know how to play each of these games.

Important to choose the games you wish to play.

Know the probability of success and probability of failure of the game you wish to play. In investing, this is the upside:downside ratio. Even more importantly, is to understand the consequence of the various outcomes from the game.

In Russian roulette, the gun has 1 bullet and the probability of being killed by the bullet is 1:6. Given the consequence of the outcome, one will choose not to play even though the probability may be in your "favour". 😀

Play the game with the highest probability of success (upside:downside of > 3:1) and with a high probability of big rewards (e.g. compounding at >15% per year over 5 years, that is doubling every 5 years).

Stay inactive, observe and learn most of the time. Act decisively and courageously when opportunity presents.

Airlines continue to be gruesome businesses.

Long term stock investors shy away from this industry.

Those with the ability to gain from investing in these "special situations" can profit from it. Those without the skill should just look for 1 foot hurdle to jump. 😀

There is a difference between investing and speculating. There is also speculating intelligently and speculating foolishly. Gambling is different from investing and speculating.

Fiscal year is January-December.
All values MYR Millions. 2023 2022
Sales/Revenue 14,772 6,437
Sales Growth 129.48% 282.50%
Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) incl. D&A 13,745 7,695
COGS excluding D&A 12,016 6,245
Depreciation & Amortization Expense 1,729 1,449
Depreciation 1,728 1,442
Amortization of Intangibles 1 8
COGS Growth 78.63% 83.65%
Gross Income 1,027 -1,257
Gross Income Growth 181.67% 49.84%
Gross Profit Margin 6.95% -
SG&A Expense 1,288 740
Other SG&A 1,288 740
SGA Growth 74.13% 30.07%
EBIT -261 -1,997
Unusual Expense 8 -494
Non Operating Income/Expense 2,017 -490
Non-Operating Interest Income 99 40
Interest Expense 1,298 1,005
Interest Expense Growth 29.18% 47.82%
Gross Interest Expense 1,298 1,005
Pretax Income 548 -2,958
Pretax Income Growth 118.51% 16.19%
Pretax Margin 3.71% -

FISCAL YEAR ENDING 2023
PRICE 0.65

MARKET CAP (MILLION) 2,720.25

ROE -8.00%
ROA 3.00%
P/B -0.26
P/E 3.25
EARNINGS YIELD 30.77%
DIVIDEND YIELD #VALUE!

Fiscal year is January-December.
All values MYR Millions. 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019
NET INCOME 837 -2,626 -2,991 -5,112 -316
NOSH (DILUTED) 4,185 4,053 3,786 3,342 3,342
FREE CASH FLOW 782 -373 -726 -2,259 1,792
DIVIDENDS #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! #VALUE! 3,409

Fiscal year is January-December.
All values MYR Millions. 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019
TOTAL EQUITY -10,469 -9,517 -6,423 -3,570 2,911
TOTAL ASSET 27,907 19,928 20,030 19,866 25,595

CASH AND EQUIVALENT 703 470 1,257 533 2,588
ST DEBT & CURRENT PORTION OF LT DEBT 6,241 4,872 4,793 4,263 2,614
LT DEBT 17,444 13,123 11,812 9,461 10,275
TOTAL DEBT 23,685 17,995 16,605 13,724 12,889
NET CASH (DEBT) -22,982 -17,525 -15,348 -13,191 -10,301

ACCOUNT RECEIVABLE 878 334 308 309 178
ACCOUNT PAYABLE 1,546 1,243 1,306 1,420 601

Why do you choose to jump over a 7 feet hurdle? Choose the 1 foot hurdle?

(Of course, I assume Yinson is a 1 foot hurdle for SSLee but for me, it is a high hurdle for now. )😀

>>>

Net Net Working Capital Formula – Further Analysis and Discussion:

Net Net Working Capital is a subset of Graham’s Net Working Capital and this is itself a subset of Net Working Capital (also known as Working Capital).

1) Net Working Capital = Current Assets – Current Liabilities

2) Graham’s Net Working Capital = Current Assets – Total Liabilities

3) Net Net Working Capital = Cash + Short Term Marketable Investments + Accounts Receivable * 75% + Inventory * 50% – Total Liabilities

Note that the results of each formula are presented in a decreasing order. That is to say Net Net Working Capital will provide the lowest and hence, most conservative, value.

In other words, all else being equal, of the three formulas above, a stock trading below Net Net Working Capital provides the investor with the largest margin of safety.

Value investing is about buying a stock at a sufficient discount to intrinsic value. Graham’s “Net Working Capital” or the “Net Net Working Capital” formulas can be used as preliminary screens to identify potentially undervalued stocks or deep value stocks.

>>>


Even when using the net working capital or net-net working capital, Benjamin Graham still demanded a margin of safety, buying only when the market price is at least 30% below these values.

Net Net Working Capital Formula – Further Analysis and Discussion:
Net Net Working Capital is a subset of Graham’s Net Working Capital is a subset of Net Working Capital (also known as Working Capital).
1) Net Working Capital = Current Assets – Current Liabilities
2) Graham’s Net Working Capital = Current Assets – Total Liabilities
3) Net Net Working Capital = Cash + Short Term Marketable Investments + Accounts Receivable * 75% + Inventory * 50% – Total Liabilities
Note that the results of each formula are presented in a decreasing order. That is to say Net Net Working Capital will provide the lowest and hence, most conservative, value. In other words, all else being equal, of the three formulas above, a stock trading below Net N et Working Capital provides the investor with the largest margin of safety.
Value investing is about buying a stock at a sufficient discount to intrinsic value. Graham’s “Net Working Capital” or the “Net Net Working Capital” formulas can be used as preliminary screens to identify potentially undervalued stocks or deep value stocks.11

Summary: (my opinion)
Its business is challenging, requiring a lot of capital to grow.: it requires lots of working capital, and lots of capex for maintainance and growth.
Its debts are accordingly high and its interest high too. It has a debt of 11.5b compared to its equity of 4.7b.

I see a lot of business risk investing in this company.

I classify this company as at most a GOOD but not in the category of a GREAT business, the type I like.

YINSON

2019 TO 2023

Its net cash from operations were negative during this period.
It had huge capex during this period.

A great company is one that generates healthy consistent and growing earnings that translate into healthy cash flows from operations. A great company requires to spend <25% of its CFO on capex, thus generating a lot of FCF that can be used to pay down the debts, buy back its own shares, give dividends or invest to grow.

At market price of RM 2.35, its market cap is at RM 6.368 b.

Its ROA is 2.35% and its ROE 9.69%.
(I like company with ROA > 10% and leveraged < 1.5x. This company is highly leveraged too. Total Asset/Total Equity = 4.1x.)

YINSON

Its account receivable doubled from 2022 to 2023, in keeping with its doubling of its revenues over the same period.

Is the rising Long-term Note Receivable worrying? This has increased from 15m to 10.3b from 2019 to 2023.

YINSON

2019 to 2023
Though reporting profits from its operations, these are not so healthy profits, as these generated little cash. In fact, the company had to raise funds (through issuing new shares in 2023. Its total debt had increased from 4.7b to 11.5b during the last 5 years.

This company's operation destroyed cash. It was debt cash positive over the last 5 years and this had increased during the period.

YINSON
From 2019 to 2023
It grew its sales from RM 1b to RM 6.3b.
Its net income grew from 235m to 452m.
Gross profit margins shrunk from 55% to 28.3%.
Net profit margins shrunk from 22.7% to 7.15%.


Comments: It grew its business hugely. However, profit margins have shrunk.
A great company has a gross profit margin of >40% or more.
A great company has a net profit margin of 10% or 20% or more.

Why had its profit margins shrunk?

YINSON 19.4.2024

Fiscal year is February-January. All values MYR Millions. 2023
TOTAL EQUITY (Book Value) 4,666.00
TOTAL ASSET 19,259.00

Fiscal year is February-January. All values MYR Millions. 2023
NET INCOME 452
NOSH (DILUTED) 2,710

Fiscal year is February-January. All values MYR Millions. 2023
FREE CASH FLOW -2,752
DIVIDENDS -87

FISCAL YEAR ENDING 2023
PRICE 2.35

MARKET CAP (MILLION) 6,368.50

ROE 9.69%
ROA 2.35%
P/B 1.36
P/E 14.09
EARNINGS YIELD 7.10%
DIVIDEND YIELD 1.37%

Fiscal year is February-January. All values MYR Millions. 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019
ACCOUNT RECEIVABLE 1,023 644 575 548 433
ACCOUNT PAYABLE 462 202 178 148 113

Long-Term Note Receivable 10,334 6,688 4,405 1,501 15


[Often, a business will allow customers to convert their overdue accounts (the business’ accounts receivable) into notes receivable. By doing so, the debtor typically benefits by having more time to pay.]

Fiscal year is February-January. All values MYR Millions. 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019
CASH AND EQUIVALENT 1,660 2,873 2,050 1,465 1,290
ST DEBT & CURRENT PORTION OF LT DEBT 1,257 662 808 489 401
LT DEBT 10,208 9,967 7,173 5,221 4,324
TOTAL DEBT 11,465 10,629 7,981 5,710 4,725
NET CASH (DEBT) -9,805 -7,756 -5,931 -4,245 -3,435

All values MYR Millions. 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019
Cash Dividends Paid - Total -87 -64 -64 -65 -108
Change in Capital Stock 754 3 -33 -77 -30
Issuance/Reduction of Debt, Net 668 2,509 2,173 979 791

Fiscal year is February-January. All values MYR Millions. 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019
Net Income before Extraordinaries 855 716 580 331 344
Funds from Operations 1,052 615 580 391 683
Changes in Working Capital -2,689 -1,963 -1,846 233 -94
Net Operating Cash Flow -1,637 -1,348 -1,266 624 589
Capital Expenditures -1,119 -68 -285 -1,223 -1,172
Free Cash Flow -2,752 -1,415 -1,548 -592 -200

Yinson
Fiscal year is February-January. All values MYR Millions. 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019
Sales/Revenue 6,324.00 3,607.00 4,849.00 2,519.00 1,035.00
Gross Income 1,792.00 1,276.00 1,270.00 561.00 567.00
Net Income 452.00 401.00 315.00 210.00 235.00
Gross Profit Margin 28.34% 35.38% 26.19% 22.27% 54.78%
Net Margin 7.15% 11.12% 6.50% 8.34% 22.71%

Insas retains lots of cash. How good is it in allocating its capital?

Buffett's and Munger's forte is their capital allocation ability. They are just fantastic in allocating the excess capital to capture high rates of return for a long period.

Insas

Current Assets 1989 m
Total Liabilities 531 m
________________________

CA - TL = 1458 m

Market Cap = 663 m (@share price of RM 1)

Net-Net value 1458m - Market Cap 663 m = 795m

Therefore, you can take this company private, settle all the liabilities and still pocket RM 795 m cash.

Benjamin Graham loved such net-net companies. However, after 2 years of investing into these undervalued stocks, should they not perform, he sold them. There must be a reason for doing so? Probably, the opportunity costs for holding onto the non-performers.

Yes, Insas is severely undervalued. How do you capture the gains? When? (The story of Aesop as told by Buffett).

Fiscal year is July-June. All values MYR Millions. 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019
Cash & Short Term Investments 1,270 1,163 1,124 827 885
ST Debt & Current Portion LT Debt 213 248 224 338 441
Long-Term Debt 183 162 161 29 74

Fiscal year is July-June. All values MYR Thousands. 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019
Non-Operating Interest Income 25,551.00 12,137.00 10,690.00 14,712.00 19,973.00
Equity in Affiliates (Pretax) - - - - 43,902.00
Interest Expense 18,775.00 16,188.00 15,217.00 21,452.00 23,220.00

SSLee

As you realise, I always study the fundamentals of a company. Knowing which company to avoid, is just as important and perhaps, more important, than the occasional one that one loads up on in a big way.

Look for the big elephant with your loaded gun. 😀 Look for the multi-baggers. Not easy but possible.


With the internet, the world is opened up to all of us for our investing.

Is Insas a company that is severely undervalued and will continue to remain severely undervalued, longer than its shareholders ability to remain solvent? 😀😀

In the absence of a "catalyst", I am afraid so.

DPO over the last 5 Yrs was 10.5%. This company retained about 90% of its earnings.

Did these retained earnings translate into increase earnings? Is the return on retained earnings positive or negative?

Its earnings are erratic year on year. We like company with earnings that are CONSISTENT and GROWING.

Also, we like company that is able to generate high ROE (preferably > 15%).

Fiscal year is July-June. All values MYR Thousands. 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019
NET INCOME 122,754 215,145 257,561 14,867 81,831 (5 Yrs Total Earnings 692,158 )

Fiscal year is July-June. All values MYR Thousands. 2023 2022 2021 2020 2019
FREE CASH FLOW 181,434 77,770 180,927 113,548 -5,915 (5 Yrs Total FCF 547,764)
DIVIDENDS -16,575 -16,575 -13,260 -13,260 -13,260 (5 Yrs Total Dividends -72,930 )

With ROE of 4.91%, it is not surprising it is trading at below its book value.

INSAS 19.4.2024

Fiscal year is July-June. All values MYR Millions.
TOTAL EQUITY (Book Value) 2,500.00
TOTAL ASSET 3,031.00

Fiscal year is July-June. All values MYR Thousands.
NET INCOME 122,754
NOSH (DILUTED) 663,021

Fiscal year is July-June. All values MYR Thousands.
FREE CASH FLOW 181,434.00
DIVIDENDS -16,575.00

FISCAL YEAR ENDING 2023
PRICE 1.00

MARKET CAP (MILLION) 663.02

ROE 4.91%
ROA 4.05%
P/B 0.27
P/E 5.40
EARNINGS YIELD 18.51%
DIVIDEND YIELD 2.50%

Posted by calvintaneng > 22 hours ago | Report Abuse

Happy morning

At this juncture due to heavy selling by major holders are actually opportunity to buy

>>>>


The problem with one without a firm philosophy.

In TSH, major shareholder was buying repeatedly. Calvin shouted it was time to buy. The price then was 1.78 and Calvin said it was cheap. Otherwise why would the major shareholder bought 500,000 shares repeatedly. (See my post on manipulation. 🤔. The price dropped from 1.78 to 1.00. (Facts).




Now in JTiasa, major shareholders were selling millions of shares. Calvin reappeared and shouted it is the best time to buy. His followers must be totally confused by Calvin’s postings.

Of course, a few here just noted the manic depressive behaviour of his wanton promotions to enrich only “her-self”.



Integrity. Intelligent. Industrious. 3iii (iiinvestsmart)$€£¥

12,702 posts

Posted by Integrity. Intelligent. Industrious. 3iii (iiinvestsmart)$€£¥ > 4 weeks ago | Report Abuse

Jtiasa is now >> rM 1.00 amd Calvin asked to buy.

It was at a low of 30 sen when on hindsight, it must be undervalued.

In 2014, Calvin asked to buy when its share was 1.40+ and gave a target price of 2.50 at that time. However, after some slight fluctuations around 1.40 which excited Calvin a lot (observing hisposting activities), it soon trended downwards to below rM1 and then to 70 sen and eventually to 30 sen. Calvin too disappeared, as observed by total silence during this period.

The price drifted to 50 sen or so. Then a sudden jump to 80 sen (?2019). Calvin posted to sell to take profit and to reinvest into other stocks he liked. (I think for many it was Cut loss from their and calvin’s Buying price of > 1.40+).


Do you think Calvin is good in spotting undervaluation?
Was he rational in his approach?
How discipline was he in his investing?

If he lost money in Jtiasa from his promotion of this stock Jtiasa in 2014, how does he value Jtiasa today.

Maybe at today’s price, this stock is already overpriced? This maybe among a reason for a major shareholder selling shares, among many other reasons.

Good morning.

3iii

05 Apr 2024 Disposed
200,000 MR HO CHEUNG CHOI
05 Apr 2024 Disposed
200,000 MR CHANG MENG
05 Apr 2024 Disposed
200,000 GENINE CHAIN LIMITED
04 Apr 2024 Disposed
2,214,700 GENINE CHAIN LIMITED
04 Apr 2024 Disposed
2,214,700 MR HO CHEUNG CHOI
04 Apr 2024 Disposed
2,214,700 MR CHANG MENG
03 Apr 2024 Disposed
800,900 GENINE CHAIN LIMITED
03 Apr 2024 Disposed
800,900 MR HO CHEUNG CHOI
03 Apr 2024 Disposed
800,900 MR CHANG MENG
02 Apr 2024 Disposed
200,000 MR HO CHEUNG CHOI

Just visited the market, and it is so "red" today! Wonderful!!!😀