I try google for a cef with >50% discount to NAV and I cant find any! MAN! this Icap already created GUINESS WORLD RECORD FOR THE LARGEST DISCOUNT TO NAV!
-9.8% *Source: Morningstar as of 9/30/2022. Third Quarter 2022 | Closed-end fund market review CEF discounts widened in the third quarter by 160 basis points. The median CEF industry discount is now -9.8%, wider than the 10-year median of -7.2%.
On behalf of the Board of Directors of icapital.biz Berhad, we wish to announce that the Net Asset Value per share of icapital.biz Berhad as at 15 February 2023 is 3.47.
Another way is to less out the cash portion, because cash is 100% of face value if distributed, and compute the discount on the remaining net assets. So theoretically, if the price of a share is less than the cash backing, then the rest of the company's assets are discounted to zero.
Once, the company used the argument that if the cash portion is taken out, then the performance of the share portfolio would have been much higher, because cash don't appreciate other than earning interest. So the same logic can be used to calculate the price discount, haha.
@speakup, your earlier calculation is the upside gain if iCap gets liquidated, 3.47/1.97=1.76, so a 76% upside. This is what attracts risk arbitrageurs, but these are undesirable fellows to the company, according to the board.
@speakup, I cannot be seen to be giving financial advice or trying to influence the share price here, very serious legal implications. I can only try to explain things according to orthodox financial and portfolio management theories and principles taught in business school and from years of experience on both the buy side and sell side of the business.
speakup, you posted "even then, 43% is very large considering that the global average CEF discount is only 10% no wonder got court battle against COL" What is the connection between the COL court case and the discount? Did COL cause the discount and hurt the shareholders?
Since the recent hottest pieces of news are the Chinese spy balloon and the AI chatbot CHATGPT, I teased the latter with a simple test question: Is it fair to compare an investment fund's total returns against a price index that is not adjusted for dividends, i.e. not a total returns index? The answer: "If an investment fund is compared against a price index that is not adjusted for dividends, the resulting comparison may not be entirely fair or accurate. This is because the price index would only reflect the capital appreciation of the stocks in the index, and would not take into account any dividend income received by the investors.
In order to get a more complete picture of an investment fund's total returns, it is generally more appropriate to compare it against a total returns index, which includes both the capital appreciation of the stocks in the index as well as any dividends paid out by those stocks. This will provide a more accurate representation of the returns that an investor would have earned by holding a portfolio of stocks represented by the index.
Comparing an investment fund's returns against a price index that is not adjusted for dividends could potentially give a misleading impression of the fund's performance, as it would not reflect the full return that an investor would have received. It is therefore generally recommended that investors use a total returns index when comparing the performance of investment funds or other investment vehicles." So this is in line with what I have been suggesting here all along.
TTB should do share buy back or declare dividend to narrow the discount. Otherwise, the large discount will only attract more arbitragers trying to dissolve the CEF for quick gains.
The minority judgement is talking about a scenario in which the same controlling shareholders use different nominee names to bypass the 20% individual shareholding limit, which is not the case here. There is no evidence of common shareholdings among the funds managed by COL. The only common factor is management by COL, not ownership control. The next milestone is the parties in concert trigger for a GO at 33%.
I have been a icap share owner since 2005. Over the years I added more shares. My average price is 1.21 since 2010. I have 100,000 shares. Present price of icap is 2.00. Here are my returns in the following scenerios.
*Present Scenerio 1 - ROI (Return On Investment) Annualised: Total Investment = 100,000 X 1.21 = RM121,000 Total Return % = (2.00+ Div 0.095+0.20)= 2.295-1.21 = 1.085x100,000 = 108500/121000*100 = 89% Annualised return % = 89/17 yrs = 5.2%
Compared to FD at 3% Compounded over 17 years = 200000/210000*100 = 165% Annualised return % = 165/17 = 9.7%
*Future scenerio 2 - Based on 3.47 NAV Liquidation:
Total Return % = 3.47-1.21 = 2.26 X 100,000 = 226,000/121000*100 = 186% Annualised return % = 186/17 = 10.9%
Conclusion: 1. Holding icap at 1.21 average price for 17 years is only 1% better than FD compounded at 3%. 2. For risk averse investors, FD is best. 3. for those who buy at icap at 2.00 now, you are taking an arbitrage risk.
Disclaimer: The above is for sharing purpose only, not an advice to buy or sell.
@Nepo Under the Malaysian Takeover Code, whenever there is a change in control of a listed company, the new owners are required to make a mandatory general offer to buy out the minority shareholders at the same price paid to the selling shareholders. The trigger point for the change of control is set at 33%, including those owned by parties acting in concert. So even though the main party may officially only own 20%, but if friends and relatives also own shares and together exceed 33%, then all of them together are deemed to be parties in concert. So funds managed by COL are parties in concert because COL have voting control over them, even though not the beneficial owner of those shares.
Assuming a GO is made, the price offered will still be a significant discount from NAV as it is not commercially viable for COL to do otherwise. What is the upside of this?
For those risk arbitrageurs wannabes these are the possible future scenarios. Come the 2023 AGM, the company is obligated to propose to shareholders an ordinary resolution (simple majority vote required) for the fund to be continued for another 5 years under its constitution. If such a resolution is not passed, then the company will hold an EGM to pass a special resolution (minimum 75% votes required) to wind up the fund. So there are two hurdles here, 50% to discontinue the fund, and 75% for liquidation. There is a no-man's land here under this scenario, the ordinary resolution to continue is not passed, i.e. the fund is to be discontinued, but the special resolution to wind up is also not passed, then what? Alternatively, shareholders holding more than 10% of the votes may call for an EGM any time to pass a special resolution to wind up the fund. So this is not called risk arbitrage for nothing.
@dumbMoney 75% votes for liquidation is unthinkable, guess the fund will unlikely liquidate in the foreseeable future. Just hold the stock and pass it on to your great grandchildren since this is an ultra-long term fund. The share price should double in 100 years haha
@thetruthseeker, the GO price cannot be lower than the highest price paid by the offeror, but nothing to stop them from offering a higher price or some other arrangements. One scheme that has ben tried overseas is the 1 cent bid, before reaching the MGO 33% trigger, make a condition offer for all the outside shares with a 2 step payment arrangement. 1 cent for all the outside shares to be deposited into a trust account initially, and all the liquidation proceeds if successful, less a reasonable service charge for doing all the heavy lifting for the rest of the shareholders. If not successful, all shares are to be returned to the offeree forthwith. So for the offerer, there is no risk of landed up with all the shares, but failed to liquidate, other than the 1 cent paid, plus expenses. If successful, realise full value for its own holdings, plus earn a fair fee for helping the others to do the same. For the outside shareholders, the upside is realise full value less a service charge. Downside is return to status quo if attempt fails, what's not to like?
@dumbmoney, in the last AGM, TTB supporters had 30% vote. CoL and shareholders at the other side had about 24%. Close to half of the shareholders never bothered to vote. It will be difficult to muster 50%, not to mention 75% necessary to liquidate the fund.
As an alternative, will it be easier that once CoL gets just below 33%, and with support of a few percents of other shareholders, they just replace the current yes-men board of directors with new faces?
Once the new board takeovers, how easy can they replace the current manager? Replace him with one of the more reputable fund houses. Given ICAP has several hunderd million assets, they should be able to negotiate a management fee far lower than the 1.5% p.a. charged by TTB.
When a new, honest fund manager is in place, through either buy back, special dividends or other means, the NAV discount could be shrunk to 10% or less, pushing the share price to above RM3. Liquidation could wait when the condition is right.
In fact, if CoL is cleared by the court to accumulate more shares, might TTB even reach out for a compromise?
For "privatisation theme", here are a few counters to look at: MPHBCAP, INSAS, ICAP, KSENG all cash rich and very deep in value, all waiting for major shareholders to give go ahead
@speakup Unfortunately, most privatisation are actually piratisation, majority owners trying to steal from the minority with not fair and not reasonable offers, hoping for acceptance because of TINA, there is no alternative!
@speakup, Litrak was ripe for privatization, despite the failed attempt in 2019. Main shareholder Gamuda wanted the cash to fund other projects. Regardsless of whom in power, the government of the day wanted to stop paying toll compensation and winning votes through toll freeze/ elimination.
When the interest of insiders and major stakeholders were aligned, it happened. Even if not, the predictable cash flow from toll collection still went to shareholders' pockets as dividend. Starting at 6% yield and rising to 10% as debt was fully paid down. Litrak was a defensive play.
What are the privatization catalysts in the other cases? If they take years/ never work out, what are the compensation for the opportunity cost?
Some Selective Capital Reduction schemes are actually self financing, using the cash sitting in the company to pay for the buyouts. The failed MAA SCR offer is a very good example of a bad deal that ended badly for all parties. I took a small loss because I bailed at the first sign of it not going through, otherwise would have gone down with the sinking ship.
Privatisation, let see ICAP or HSPLANT go private / take-over first.
In the above article, Maybank IB said a notable privatisation candidate is Hap Seng Plantations Holdings Bhd, as it trades at an attractive EV of RM33,255 per planted hectare, a P/BV of 0.81 times, and with net cash of 54 sen per share.
In investing we must 以小人之心度君子之腹,meaning we must use bad mindset to judge good person.
HAPSENG boss is too far richer, less chance to swindle money from HSPLANT.
@i3gambler Unfortunately, the majority of privatisation deals by majority owners were at not fair and not reasonable prices. No doubt at a premium to market, but still big discounts from NAV. Would you accept a $2.50 offer for iCap, for example?
This book is the result of the author's many years of experience and observation throughout his 26 years in the stockbroking industry. It was written for general public to learn to invest based on facts and not on fantasies or hearsay....
speakup
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I try google for a cef with >50% discount to NAV and I cant find any!
MAN! this Icap already created GUINESS WORLD RECORD FOR THE LARGEST DISCOUNT TO NAV!