E&O

Profitability
Gross Margin +58.56
Operating Margin -16.86
Pretax Margin +58.66
Net Margin +42.84
Return on Assets 1.83
Return on Equity 3.73
Return on Total Capital -0.83
Return on Invested Capital 2.22

Farlim

Profitability
Gross Margin +20.93
Operating Margin -51.23
Pretax Margin -63.97
Net Margin -64.28
Return on Assets -7.17
Return on Equity -8.07
Return on Total Capital -6.42
Return on Invested Capital -

Hua Yang

Profitability
Gross Margin +40.96
Operating Margin +15.05
Pretax Margin +11.62
Net Margin +1.27
Return on Assets 0.16
Return on Equity 0.35
Return on Total Capital 2.47
Return on Invested Capital 0.23

Eco World

Profitability
Gross Margin +18.56
Operating Margin -9.21
Pretax Margin -79.05
Net Margin -146.54
Return on Assets -7.00
Return on Equity -8.91
Return on Total Capital -0.44
Return on Invested Capital -7.78

Crescendo

Profitability
Gross Margin +39.75
Operating Margin +22.01
Pretax Margin +16.72
Net Margin +10.68
Return on Assets 1.74
Return on Equity 2.66
Return on Total Capital 3.94
Return on Invested Capital

A lot of developments in i-City but the shareholders have not received their rewards.

Using GDV as the starting point, we can, as a guide, expect gross profit margin of just above 50%, pretax profit margin of about 30% and Net margin (after tax) of about 25% for a well run property development company.

Matrix

Profitability
Gross Margin +54.96
Operating Margin +29.55
Pretax Margin +29.69
Net Margin +22.99
Return on Assets 7.85
Return on Equity 11.04
Return on Total Capital 12.11
Return on Invested Capital 10.09


The profit margins of a well run property development company.

19/05/23
RM0.19 MYR

Fiscal year is July-June.
All values MYR Thousands. 2022 2021 2020 2019 2018
5-year trend
Sales/Revenue 101,786.6 76,460.3 80,612.8 122,498.5 115,171.2
Gross Income 56,789.5 37,834.4 36,483.9 59,263.0 58,857.8
Pretax Income 29,302.0 7,922.6 5,288.3 8,496.4 6,459.3
Net Income Available to Common 22,230.6 3,984.5 3,001.2 4,340.4 3,772.3
EPS (Diluted) 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00

Funds from Operations 30,696.6 17,867.9 12,433.9 13,497.7 8,998.8
Net Operating Cash Flow 21,264.3 16,110.7 30,617.5 19,341.1 1,170.1
Capital Expenditures (2,649.0) (848.0) (377.1) (2,519.3) (1,441.2)
Free Cash Flow 18,615.3 15,262.7 30,240.4 16,821.9 (271.1)
Free Cash Flow Yield 8.42%



Cash Dividends Paid - Total (4,028.3) (4,028.3) (4,028.3) - -

Cash & Short Term Investments 53,135.4 45,311.7 49,220.2 30,865.2 15,429.6
ST Debt & Current Portion LT Debt 6,748.5 6,270.0 6,344.4 844.0 1,331.6
Long-Term Debt 24,617.1 23,622.2 20,913.9 14,580.6 15,172.2

Total Accounts Receivable 11,128.2 10,445.7 8,969.9 15,902.9 24,273.7
Inventories 11,120.4 9,588.9 9,623.9 14,881.3 19,242.2
Accounts Payable 830.5 1,292.0 1,303.5 765.0 2,672.0

Total Current Assets 84,201.3 65,856.8 68,330.5 63,954.0 63,747.2
Total Current Liabilities 19,916.4 16,403.9 16,793.7 7,941.9 9,694.6
Current Ratio 4.23 4.01 4.07 8.05 6.58
Quick Ratio 3.67 3.43 3.50 6.18 4.59
Cash Ratio 2.67 2.76 2.93 3.89 1.59

Net Property, Plant & Equipment 41,516.3 36,616.5 36,116.1 31,127.7 32,495.2
Total Assets 136,107.2 112,778.3 110,430.3 95,801.5 96,828.2
Return On Average Assets 17.86%

Total Liabilities 45,787.2 40,666.6 38,260.7 23,001.8 25,305.2
Total Shareholders' Equity 90,320.0 72,111.7 72,169.6 72,799.7 71,523.0

KEY STOCK DATA
P/E Ratio (TTM)
5.48(05/19/23)
EPS (TTM)
RM0.03
Market Cap
RM201.41 M
Shares Outstanding
805.65m
Public Float
246.93 M

Ratios & Margins Carlo Rino Group Bhd
All values updated annually at fiscal year end
Valuation
P/E Ratio (TTM) 5.48
P/E Ratio (including extraordinary items) 7.21
Price to Sales Ratio 1.70
Price to Book Ratio 1.92
Price to Cash Flow Ratio 8.15
Enterprise Value to EBITDA 5.18
Enterprise Value to Sales 1.47
Total Debt to Enterprise Value 0.21
Total Debt to EBITDA 0.90
EPS (recurring) 0.03
EPS (basic) 0.03
EPS (diluted) 0.03
Efficiency
Revenue/Employee -
Income Per Employee -
Receivables Turnover 9.44
Total Asset Turnover 0.82
Liquidity
Current Ratio 4.23
Quick Ratio 3.67
Cash Ratio 2.67
Profitability
Gross Margin +55.79
Operating Margin +26.00
Pretax Margin +28.79
Net Margin +21.84
Return on Assets 17.86
Return on Equity 27.37
Return on Total Capital 23.66
Return on Invested Capital 21.10
Capital Structure
Total Debt to Total Equity 34.73
Total Debt to Total Capital 25.78
Total Debt to Total Assets 23.04
Interest Coverage 36.92
Long-Term Debt to Equity 27.26
Long-Term Debt to Total Capital 20.23
Long-Term Debt to Assets 0.18

Profits of plantation companies are affected by crude palm oil (commodity) prices which are heavily influenced by many external factors:

- seasonal fluctuation on palm oil production,
- weather conditions
- availability of supply of other major vegetable oils e.g. soya
- labour supply in oil palm plantations' FFB harvesting and unloading activities.
- strength of the ringgit
- increase in the oil palm productive areas
- tariffs for palm oil products

CPO prices had experienced a decline beginning the third quarter of 2022 due to the

- high CPO production season,
- rising palm oil stocks and
- declining soybean oil prices.
Palm oil industry saw higher production, exports and revenue in 2022

The Malaysian Palm Oil Board (MPOB) expects the price of crude palm oil (CPO) to average at RM5,100 a tonne in 2022, which is 15.7% higher compared to RM4,407 a tonne in 2021.

The government agency also foresees the price of CPO to stabilise at an average of RM3,800 a tonne in 2023 in anticipation of

- higher palm oil production,
- improved weather conditions in the second half of 2023 and
- higher availability of supply of other major vegetable oils.

https://myinvestingnotes.blogspot.com/2008/08/investment-policies-based-on-benjamin.html

FRIDAY, 1 AUGUST 2008
Investment Policies (Based on Benjamin Graham)
Summary of Investment Policies

A. INVESTMENT FOR FIXED INCOME:
US Savings Bonds (FDs or Amanah Sahams for Malaysians)

B. INVESTMENT FOR INCOME, MODERATE LONG-TERM APPRECIATION AND PROTECTION AGAINST INFLATION:
(1) INVESTMENT FUNDS bought at reasonable price.
(2) Diversified list of primary common stocks (BLUE CHIPS) bought at reasonable price.

C. INVESTMENT CHIEFLY FOR PROFIT: 4 approaches are open to both the small and the large investors:
(1) Representative common stocks bought when the MARKET level is clearly LOW.
(2) GROWTH STOCKS, when these can be obtained at reasonable prices in relation to actual accomplishment – GROWTH INVESTING.
(3) Purchase of securities selling well BELOW INTRINSIC VALUE – VALUE INVESTING.
(4) Purchase of WELL-SECURED PRIVILEGED SENIOR ISSUES (bonds and preferred shares).
(5) SPECIAL SITUATIONS: Mergers, arbitrages, cash pay-outs.

D. SPECULATION:
(1) Buying stock in new or virtually new ventures (IPOs) .
(2) TRADING in the market.
(3) Purchase of "GROWTH STOCKS" at GENEROUS PRICES.


_______________


For DEFENSIVE INVESTORS: Portfolio A & B
(Portfolio A: Cash, FDs, Bonds Portfolio B: Mutual funds, Blue chips)

For ENTERPRISING INVESTORS: Portfolio A & B & C
(Portfolio C: Buy in Low Market, Buy Growth stocks at fair value, Buy value stocks i.e. bargains, High grade bonds and preferred shares, Arbitrages)

For SPECULATORS: Portfolio D
(Should set aside a sum for this separate from their money in investing.)

My first post in my blog on investing on 1.8.2008. Soon, I can look back at 15 years of blogging and sharing.
I noted too that many bloggers whom I have linked my site with have stopped blogging.
ht tps://my investingnotes.blog spot.com/2008/08/investment-policies-based-on-benjamin.html

myinvestingnotes.blogspot.my (Bullbear Buffett Stock Investing Notes)
Keep INVESTING Simple and Safe (KISS) ****Investment Philosophy, Strategy and various Valuation Methods**** The same forces that bring risk into investing in the stock market also make possible the large gains many investors enjoy. It’s true that the fluctuations in the market make for losses as well as gains but if you have a proven strategy and stick with it over the long term you will be a winner!****Warren Buffett: Rule No. 1 - Never lose money. Rule No. 2 - Never forget Rule No. 1.

My first post in my blog on investing on 1.8.2008. Soon, I can look back at 15 years of blogging and sharing.
I noted too that many bloggers whom I have linked my site with have stopped blogging.
https://myinvestingnotes.blogspot.com/2008/08/investment-policies-based-on-benjamin.html

myinvestingnotes.blogspot.my (Bullbear Buffett Stock Investing Notes)
Keep INVESTING Simple and Safe (KISS) ****Investment Philosophy, Strategy and various Valuation Methods**** The same forces that bring risk into investing in the stock market also make possible the large gains many investors enjoy. It’s true that the fluctuations in the market make for losses as well as gains but if you have a proven strategy and stick with it over the long term you will be a winner!****Warren Buffett: Rule No. 1 - Never lose money. Rule No. 2 - Never forget Rule No. 1.

https://klse.i3investor.com/web/hti/advice

Very good advice.

>>>
"Suriyan

*Public Bank Bhd's* shareholders have voted in favour of the group's final remuneration of RM20 million, together with various benefits in kind, to its late founder Tan Sri Teh Hong Piow, in appreciation and recognition of his contribution to the country's third largest bank by asset size."
>>>>


A small amount with a big appreciation value to the great steward of PBB.

kcchong nice article.

For newcomers to the stock market, read widely to acquire the knowledge and have a methodology to invest into the stock market. You must know your investment objectives, your time horizon, your appetite for risk taking and your capacity to take this risk. Learn accounting (not to the level of the accountants, but enough to be a safe investor), learn about what market fluctuations mean to you as an investor, learn all about how to value a stock (for many stocks, you will not be able to value, but you must know your circle of competence that these are outside this circle of yours) and learn about margin of safety (as espounded by Benjamin Graham). Learn all about behavioural finance and how your thinking drives your behaviour, mood and body. Be able to remain rational although the herd maybe behaving very differently from yours.

Invest regularly, diversify (but do not over diversity, diworsify), reinvest your dividends, stay with good quality (growth) companies and for the long term.

Good luck.

If TSH is as good as what promoter calvintaneng suggested, why did its price not continue to rise from RM 1.80 upwards? Why has its price dropped back to RM 1.00?

If you have any investing questions or issues, please share in this thread. Hopefully, those in this forum can try to offer some suggestions or answers.

I own Maybank for many years already. Dividends are not taken out but reinvested again via DRIP. I have not done any serious calculations for many years on Maybank. Just excited to know stkoay's returns of 20+% over 2 years in Maybank. Maybe I will relook how he did it, trying to emulate his returns. :-)

https://sgx.i3investor.com/servlets/forum/600041904.jsp

The Singapore version of i3 investor is extremely quiet, almost not alive at all.
The Malaysian counterpart is also rather quiet too. The bear market must have taken a huge toll on many players. The "snake bite" effect is real. :-)

Yes, either method gives the same result. :-)

Perhaps a better way to calculate your return:

Initial capital employed:
Total in 2021 + Total in 2022
= $ P for X number of shares.

Today, you have
(1) X number of shares valued at RM 8.71X
(2) Y number of shares from DRP valued at RM 8.71Y
(3) cash dividends not invested yet, RM Z.

Final amount of this investment today is:
= RM 8.71 X+ RM8.71Y + RM Z

Then you can calculate the return:
= { (RM 8.71 X + RM 8.71Y + Z) - P } / P

>>>
Posted by stkoay > 5 hours ago | Report Abuse

I bought first batch from March to early May 2021 at average 8.32.
2nd batch on November n December 2021 at average 8.02
...then a little in June and September 2022 at 8.61 and 8.93.

.....now still holding recent cash dividend waiting for good entry point....
>>>

Year .. Share Price range (RM) .. DPS (sen)
2019 .. 8.37 - 9.71 .. 57.00
2020 .. 6.96 - 9.01 .. 52.50
2021 .. 7.79 - 8.60 .. 66.50
2022 .. 8.17 - 9.18 ..58.00
2023 .. 8.26 - 8.87 ..

>>>
Posted by stkoay > May 17, 2023 11:39 AM | Report Abuse

I started accumulating from March 2021.
My current average cost is 7.896, after factoring in DRP shares.
At 8.70, my total return (unrealized plus cash dividend) is 21.8%

....that is over just a 2 years duration....and the overall market is down during this period.
>>>

Am interested to know how you calculate your total return. Thks.

Assuming you have bought Maybank in 2013 at the lowest price of RM 8.70 and have received RM 5.59 in dividends to date.

At today's price of RM 8.73, your capital appreciation in share price is RM 0.03 and the total returns you received is RM 0.03 + RM 5.59 = RM 5.62.

Your compound annual return for the last 10 years is approximately 5.11%.


[Remember to reinvest your dividends.]

Maybank

Adjusted Price RM
2013 Price range 8.70 - 10.80
2023 Price range 8.26 - 8.87

Dividends per share (sen) received
2013 51
2014 55
2015 57
2016 50
2017 55
2018 57
2019 57
2020 52.50
2021 66.50
2022 58

Total dividends per share received over the last 10 years = 559 sen = RM 5.59

Today, Maybank closes at RM 8.73 per share

>>>>
Posted by Mikecyc > 1 week ago | Report Abuse

Haha finally see the Speaker Callvin photo is uploaded… the old man whom bullied me as a Newbie on 2019 . Uncles n Aunties May ask you the following questions loh :

1) posted in Netx on 2020 .. asking ppl to sell other shares to buy Netx … said had sold 8 houses out of 20 houses to buy … repeatedly saying Win Win Win with cost 1 sen .. but posted on 2022 in Tsh is Lost in Netx !!! What is this investing tactic ???

2) Promoted Tsh up to Peak Range RM 1.80 … then on Sliding down , asked followers to Averaging down on every 10 sen down !!! What is this Investing tactic ???

3) Promoted Scomies from 7 sen to 12 sen on 2019 … then posted another Blog promoting Scomies from 12 sen to TP 30 sen … but Scomies is Sliding down from 12.5 sen … just Pump n Dump ..

Ppl questioning you .. replied is did not Promote at 12 sen even shown your blog … then said is small matter even in PN17 as Mother will pay back the Loan .. how is Scomi and Scomies today ? Scomi is delisted… Scomies Price is worst than delisted price ( Current Price divided by 5 ) !!! What is this Investing Tactics ??? Hahahaha
>>>>


Hmmmm!!!

PHILIP FISHER'S WISE WORDS
"The refusal to sell at a loss, while completely natural and normal, is probably one of the most dangerous in which we can indulge ourselves in the entire investment process.

More money has probably been lost by investors holding a stock they really did not want until they could 'at least come out even' than from any other single reason. If to these actual losses are added the profits that might have been made through the proper reinvestment of these funds if such reinvestment had been made when the mistake was first realized, the cost of self-indulgence becomes truly tremendous."

(Common Stocks and Uncommon Profits)

If you owned a very lousy stock and lost money, your opportunity cost is you could have interest accrued from an FD at zero risk.

If you own a FD at zero risk giving low interest, your opportunity cost is you could have owned a good company with some risks attacked with potential for higher returns. Also FD is not without risk as it may not provide a rral return due to inflation.

10 years returns of 3 bank stocks

Company.. Pr appreciation (Compound) .. DY
MBB .. (1.29%) .. 6.53%
PBB .. 1.86% .. 3.94%
HLB .. 4.11% .. 2.78%

Price volatility of Maybank annually is small.

Year.. Pr range ..Pr Volatility
2021.. 7.79 - 8.60 ..10.4%
2022 .. 8.17 - 9.18 .. 12.36%
2023 .. 8.26 - 8.87 .. 7.38%

If you are a very long term holder, even if you manage to buy at the lowest price, this contributes a very small boost to the compound return from the stock over many years.

If you hope to buy and sell short term, you will need the luck of a trader. Most traders lose money in stocks over the many and frequent transactions in the long run.

ROE - 5 Yr Avg14.12
ROE - Latest FY12.26
Book Value/Share (RM) 0.38
Latest P/B 1.91

ROE - 5 Yr Avg 6.61%
Book Value per share RM 10.17

At a ROE of 6.61% and probably fluctuating little around this figure for a long time, and given the risk free interest rate today is 4% and rising, how much would you be willing to pay to own Tenaga? Its fair price is probably its present book value of RM 10.17, As a value investor , you may wish only to own it if you can get at a discount (for a margin of safety). OTOH, you may wish to look for another stock.

MKT Capt (RM m) : 74.5
ENT Value (RM m) : 3,696.2

The above tells a story/

Price RM 2.08
Market Cap 419 m

EPS (sen) Latest FY 22.31 sen
DPS(sen) - 2022 17 sen
Latest DY (%) on 2022 DPS 8,06%

BV per share RM 1.98
P/B 1.05 x
ROE latest FY 11.30%

Dicey Strategies: Can work and Doesn't work sometimes

Of the eight dimensions on which value investors can differ, two invite suspicion.

1. Shorting is one.
It just doesn’t work that well. I know of no principals that both rely on shorting and outperform over the long term.

2. Leverage is the other.
While debt can be milked for bonus returns much of the time, one big margin call can be enough to foul years of solid results.



I nonetheless include shorting and leverage on the list to allow for the possibility that they could be made to work under some circumstances.

But they’re dicey.
They’re back doors out of the kingdom of value investing and into a land of some other, less practical strategy.
Some would say that this invalidates them as intelligent tactics.
To those with long-term perspectives, something that doesn’t work sometimes can ultimately be indistinguishable from something that doesn’t work at all.

7. Seventh is complexity.
Some value investors prefer simple setups. They like common stock in straightforward companies. I do, as the model makes clear. But others like it complicated. They may seek convertible bonds that become equity only under hard-to-forecast circumstances. They may prefer stock in development-stage pharmaceutical companies undergoing clinical trials, or in technology companies whose fortunes are dependent on the outcome of pioneering research.

They adore these complications not because they’re falling prey to the cleverness bias. They adore them because it gives them less buy-side competition. Other investors will simply abstain from trying to sort out convoluted situations. This can keep prices lower than they would be otherwise.


8. Eighth is shorting.
Shorting is a way to bet on a stock price’s decline. It involves selling stock without actually owning it, by renting it from someone who does, with the goal of profiting when the price falls.

Shorting is theoretically attractive. It promises a way to benefit from a finding that a security is overpriced. But it’s thorny to implement. Shares to rent can be hard to find, fees can be high, and a short squeeze can cause a price meant to plunge to actually soar.

Despite these complications, some value investors do short. But many do so as agents, not as principals. That’s because it increases their compensation. Shorting is a hallmark of a complicated fund. It’s the kind of stunt that managers attempt in order to justify compensation schemes of 2 percent plus 20 percent. It’s a ticket out of the land of 1 percent.

5. A fifth valid difference is quality.
Our approach has been to focus on how good a business is in an absolute sense, before considering price. We labor over historic performance metrics, strategic positioning, and shareholder-friendliness. We look for quality.

But an equally convinced group focuses on buying companies that are inexpensive relative to how good they are. To them garbage is fine, as long as it’s cheap garbage. Some in this group get exceptional results.

My focus on company quality reflects three of my other preferences: inactivism, concentration, and a long holding period. What I buy has to be good because I’m not going to fix it, I’ve only got a few others like it, and it’s mine forever.

These preferences aren’t about great foresight or morality. They’re about taxes. Unrealized appreciation isn’t taxed in the United States, so everything else being equal, holding is advantageous. I draw a straight line from tax policy to investment policy.


6. Sixth is leverage.
Leverage is debt. What is true for operating companies is true for investors: debt amplifies results. When an investor buys on margin, results that would otherwise be good become exceptional, and results that would otherwise be bad become catastrophic. The potential of the latter keeps many value investors away from debt. But not all.

3. A third valid difference is activism.
Activist investors agitate for change in the companies that they own. They might be viewed as their own catalysts. The alternative is staying uninvolved. It’s the choice of most investors, both good and bad. I call it inactivism, since passive implies index fund investing.

Activism requires an extraordinary level of gravitas and tenacity. People who are feared and skilled in this specialty are the ones that achieve the best results. Activism is not something in which one fruitfully dabbles.


4. Fourth is diversification.
Some value investors have diversified portfolios, with perhaps 50 or more names. Others prefer concentration, with fewer than 10.

These thresholds depend somewhat on the amount of money managed. A $50,000 portfolio spread out among a dozen different stocks might be considered diversified, while a $10 billion fund invested in a dozen names might seem concentrated.

Diversification tends to decrease volatility, should that be a goal. But, the more diversified a portfolio is, the harder it is to beat a relevant index.

One way to appreciate this is through the law of large numbers. It’s a principle from probability. It says that the more times an experiment is run, the closer the average result will be to the expected result. In investing, the expected result is the index’s return. So the more names in the portfolio—each name being an experiment, in the parlance of the law—the closer the portfolio’s return will
be to that of the index.

Some stripes of value investing force one into a diversified portfolio. Small cap investing can, since there aren’t that many shares traded of each company. They’re small. So a small-cap investor that adds $100,000 to assets under management might have to find a new name because the ones already owned don’t have enough shares available to buy.

1. First is asset class.
Listed equities return best over time, as addressed. But there are practitioners able to squeeze performance out of other sorts of holdings. Bonds work for some, real estate works for others. They’re tougher rows to hoe, but some hoe them well.

2. A second valid difference is holding period.
Some value investors plan to hold what they buy for just months. Others hope to hold indefinitely. Different timelines occasion different priorities. For example, short-term holders consider catalysts. A catalyst is a reason that a price could soar from the depressed level that helped to make a security attractive. Unexpectedly good quarterly results could be a catalyst, as could the dismissal of an unpopular executive.

Catalysts are less interesting to long-term investors. They’re too near-term a concern. Never intending to sell, I don’t give them a thought.

Differences between Value Investors

The distinction between price and value is the sole requisite principle of value investing. It’s the only must. Beyond that, there are valid differences in approach. I see eight.


Summary

Dimensions on which bona fide value investors can differ include:

1. Asset class

2. Holding period

3. Activism

4. Diversification

5. Quality

6. Leverage

7. Complexity

8. Shorting

TSH Resources

Year Price range (LPr - HPr) adjusted for capital changes RM
2002 0.16 - 0.26
2007 0.51 - 1.10
2012 1.25 - 1.91
2017 1.56 - 1.94
2022 0.90 - 1.89
2023 0.99 - 1.15


Year Dividends per Share (sens)
2002 0.27
2003 0.53
2004 0.53
2005 1.67
2006 1.67
2007 1.67
2008 2.20
2009 1.67
2010 1.67
2011 2.00
2012 2.33
2013 1.67
2014 2.33
2015 2.50
2016 2.00
2017 2.00
2018 2.00
2019 1.00
2020 1.00
2021 1.50
2022 11.00

Total Dividends per share paid out from 2002 to 2022 = 43.21 sen

Dutch Lady

Year Price range (LPr - HPr)
2002 3.85 - 8.35
2007 10.00 - 13.30
2012 23.40 - 37.80
2017 54.00 - 62.00
2022 30.00 - 34.60
2023 25.80 - 30.30

Year Dividends (sens)
2002 5.8
2003 12.8
2004 56
2005 63.2
2006 63.2
2007 63.2
2008 42.1
2009 65.6
2010 72.5
2011 72.5
2012 260
2013 260
2014 220
2015 220
2016 220
2017 280
2018 200
2019 100
2020 80
2021 50
2022 50

Total Dividends paid out from 2002 to 2022 = 2456.9 sen = RM 24.569

Dutch Lady

Year Price range (LPr - HPr)
2002 3.85 - 8.35
2007 10.00 - 13.30
2012 23.40 - 37.80
2017 54.00 - 62.00
2022 30.00 - 34.60
2023 25.80 - 30.30

Year Dividends (sens)
2002 5.8
2003 12.8
2004 56
2005 63.2
2006 63.2
2007 63.2
2008 42.1
2009 65.6
2010 72.5
2011 72.5
2012 260
2013 260
2014 220
2015 220
2016 220
2017 280
2018 200
2019 100
2020 80
2021 50
2022 50

Total Dividends paid out from 2002 to 2022 = 2456.9 sen = RM 24.569

Why did I invest in iCAP in 2005?

Essentially for long term capital gains.
Time horizon was 15 years.
Hoping for a CAGR in its NAV of 15% per year. :-)

Alas, have to settle for a lower returns. But for those who has to cash out now or soon, very sad for them as they will be leaving a lot of cash behind.