Posted by Sslee > Jan 14, 2022 11:23 AM | Report Abuse
My question. Those IDSS this morning, do they need to cover back their short sell today or the next monday since IDSS has been suspended for the day? ----------------------------------- i think need to cover back on the same day else not tally.
During this turbulence time, there is a need to have a good leader especially with the proven success story for the past. The leaders of Airasia have proven that their leaderships have able to at least sustained the going concern of the company from the passed few crisis. With the experience they have, strongly believe there might be some plans ahead which are not implemented or announced yet.
It is just a few steps further for Airasia to be great again as the COVID 19 situation has became clearer day by day as the mutation is not as deadly as compared to previous. Perhaps this will be the final round of mutation transplant which all countries around the world have been waiting for opening up their air to revive the tourism industry again.
The ultimate point is to choose for a company with a good management team especially in this tough investment situation and maintain for long term goal instead of short term which the golden periods already closed.
Shall see that this counter will leave the penny stocks category soon towards the 2nd half of the year.
High Fixed and Variable Costs Aircraft are very expensive pieces of equipment, and airlines have to continue making large lease or loan repayments regardless of business conditions. Large commercial jets can have a lifetime as long as 25-30 years. Airlines also need large labor forces to run their complex operations, making payroll expenses another component of relatively fixed costs that have to be incurred month after month. Volatility in oil prices is yet another challenge that airlines have to contend with (See also: 4 Ways Airlines Hedge Against Oil). Add in security costs that have skyrocketed after 9/11, and it is apparent that few airlines can surmount the formidable obstacle of their high-cost structure.
Exogenous Events Can Suddenly Affect Demand The airline industry is particularly vulnerable to exogenous events such as terrorism, political instabilities and natural disaster, which can drastically affect their operations and passenger demand. For example, in April of 2010, airlines collectively estimated to have racked up losses in excess of $2 billion from the closure of European airspace, caused by massive ash clouds following a volcanic eruption in Iceland. The U.S. airline industry suffered losses of about $7.7 billion in 2001 despite massive federal aid, largely due to a plunge in passenger demand after the 9/11 attacks.
Reputation for Hassles and Poor Service Long lines due to security procedures at check-in, cramped seating, inconvenient schedules, poor service - the list of airline travelers' complaints is a lengthy one. The perception that air travel is an ordeal makes it very difficult for airlines to charge the higher prices that are necessary to return to profitability. Social media has propelled a number of what can only be described as PR disasters recently, and undoubtedly caused harm to the industry. (For more: The Biggest Airline PR Disasters of All Time.)
The Bottom Line Airlines provide a vital service, but factors including the continuing existence of loss-making carriers, bloated cost structure, vulnerability to exogenous events and a reputation for poor service combine to present a huge impediment to profitability. While a handful of low-cost airlines have successfully managed to post consistent profits, by and large, profitable airlines are few and far between.
How on earth does Air Asia actually make its money? The likes of Air Asia, Jetstar, Tiger and other budget airlines have opened up the world to millions of travellers who wouldn't otherwise have the means to go on that holiday to Bali or Phuket or Hawaii.
Shaun Busuttil 29 Nov 2016
According to this article by Bloomberg Gadfly columnist, David Fickling, Air Asia doesn’t actually make the major chunk of its income through any of these extra revenue channels, and in fact runs at a loss when just ticket sales are concerned. Even when food, baggage and all these additional charges are taken into account, Air Asia would be lucky to break even.
Which begs the question: how on earth is an airline like Air Asia able to stay in business? And not just stay in business, but become the dominant budget airline in Asia, winning multiple Skytrax awards along the way?
Well, surprisingly, Air Asia is as much in the aircraft selling and leasing business as it is in whisking passengers all over the world in shiny red planes, and indeed makes the bulk of its income from the latter. That’s according to the airline’s third quarter financial results that were released recently, which showed a 11 percent increase in revenue, and a whopping 187 percent increase in profit after tax.
Pretty impressive huh?!
But how does it work? I hear you ask. It’s actually fairly simple.
Air Asia is Airbus Group SE’s second biggest customer (behind Indian low-cost carrier IndiGo), with a total of 575 planes to its name, 401 of which have yet to be delivered. That means Air Asia has huge negotiating power when it comes to putting in an order for another aircraft. It can basically ask for a discount whenever it wants, and Airbus is likely to oblige. Which makes total sense if you were Airbus: you wouldn’t want to upset your second biggest customer now would you?
In basic terms, what this means is that Air Asia is able to purchase Airbus aircraft at prices lower than the usual market rates – much lower than other airlines and airline leasing companies, such as GE Capital Aviation Services.
But now here comes the crucial part. Whenever Air Asia feels its time for another cash injection, or when it feels it has too many aircraft on its books, it simply sells some of its aircraft at market value to an airline lessor and then leases the aircraft back, paying the normal lease rates.
Yep, it’s the old sale-and-leaseback routine!
Now, when you add up how much Air Asia originally bought the aircraft for from Airbus (remember, often at a discounted rate), factor in the costs to lease the aircraft from the new lessor, and then compare that to how much Air Asia sold the aircraft to the lessor airline company, Air Asia is left with a hefty profit!
So that’s how it’s able to make money.
For us consumers, this state of affairs is bloody brilliant. Air Asia is able to continue offering us these cheap airfares to exotic parts of the world whilst still turning a hefty profit. Everybody wins!
Just how long this will continue for is obviously up in the air. Anything can change at any moment. But at least for the time being, it’s a great time to be alive and fly!
Given their early success, and seeing the huge vacuum in the market, Airasia then decided that the right step was make their company the LCC leader in ASEAN in order to have economy of scale and enable them to drive costs even lower, and the solution was to go all in at creating associates and joint ventures in South East Asia.
This enabled their second step, which was to buy their planes in bulk.
Airasia was one of the first (and to do it to such extremes) to make gigantic plane orders that stretched more than 10 years in advance.
In 2007, they secured an order of 130 Airbus A320’s for delivery up to 2012, planes worth easily 10-20 times the value of the company then.
They then increased this amount to 200 Airbus A320’s by 2008.
In 2011, they ordered another 200 of them, and from this order, becomes Airbus’s single largest customer.
In 2012, they placed orders for another 100 of them, and in 2016, they did it again by ordering another 100.
By placing such huge orders, they were also able to obtain discounts of 30% or more off the list price, and get the planes customized to suit their needs exactly.
In addition, as their initial orders were made just after the financial crisis, and before the boom in low cost airlines (A trend that was sparked by Airasia) in Asia, they were able to buy large amount of planes at a discount from the already low prices that were at the low end of the cycle.
This allowed Airasia Group to charge its Joint Ventures and Associates leasing fees for using their planes (The company AAC was created in 2013 to manage this) and it also enabled them to be in a business to of selling planes and slots to airplane leasing companies when the airline boom started.
In just a few years, this would go from a cost cutting measure, to a highly profitable venture and one of the key reason for Airasia’s profitability.
Aircraft Operating Lease Income
With the purchase of these huge purchase planes to fund their regional ambitions, as stated previously, Airasia, the Group Company now had a new income stream that would grow far more profitable than expected.
It would not be unreasonable to say that by 2016, this has grown to be their second largest revenue and largest profit contributor.
Without it, the Airasia Group would be lossmaking.
Externally, this also caused huge headaches with accusations by GMT Research that Airasia was only profitable due to the leasing of these planes resulting in profit transfers from unprofitable regional Joint Ventures, to the group holding.
Internally, i’m sure the other joint venture or associate partners did not feel comfortable about this as well, as it could be seen as Airasia Berhad milking the associates for all its worth.
This culminated in the sale of the planes and the leasing business
28 Feb 2018 (Completed 31 Dec 2018) – BBAM Limited Partnership / FLY RM 9,775.6 million and RM 262.3 million (82 Aircraft and 14 Engines) 24 Aug 2018 (Completed 8 August 2019) – Castlelake L.P. USD 739.5 million (RM 3,559.5 million) (25 Aircraft) 25 July 2019 (Completed 31 December 2019) – Castlelake L.P. (RM 1,240 million) (14 Airbus A320-200) Resulting in net gains of RM 298.8 million and RM 101.54 million, but a net loss in profit of around RM 643 million p.a until the new planes come in.
For the more cynical and realistic individuals, the real reason for the sale would be to settle Tony Fernandes’s and Kamarudin’s RM 1 billion margin loan that taken to inject into the company back in 2016 when prices of the shares were so low.
COVID19 non-withstanding, i do consider this a bit of a mistake.
With hindsight, it looked like a good decision due to COVID 19 happening, but I think fundamentally, it was an erroneous decision, made mainly for the reason of paying out enough dividends for Tony and Kamaruddin to pay back the margin loan, as the income lost is really too significant and the gains too little.
it never transform since mid 2020, he hv so many chances to transform in the 2020 but not hiring the right ppl and spot the problem in right time.. that is why i sold when it reach 1.2 last year and never buy back...
KUALA LUMPUR (Jan 13): AirAsia Group Bhd has failed in its bid to secure an extension of the relief period from being classified as a Practice Note 17 (PN17) company.
The low-cost carrier is thus deemed a PN17 company now.
The group had applied to Bursa Malaysia Securities to extend the relief period beyond Jan 7.
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“The board of directors wishes to inform that after due consideration of all facts and circumstances including all written representations and documents submitted before Bursa, Bursa has decided to dismiss the appeal.
“Further announcement will be made in due course regarding this matter,” the carrier said in a filing with Bursa on Thursday.
AirAsia triggered the PN17 suspended criteria in July 2020 after its external auditors, Ernst & Young PLT, issued an unqualified audit opinion with material uncertainty relating to going concern in respect of its audited financial statements for the financial year ended Dec 31, 2019 (FY19) and its shareholders’ equity on a consolidated basis was 50% or less of its share capital.
The airline had also triggered the prescribed criteria pursuant to Paragraph 8.04 and Paragraph 2.1(a) of PN17 of Bursa's Main Market Listing Requirements (Main LR), where AirAsia’s shareholders' equity on a consolidated basis was 25% or less of its share capital and such shareholders' equity is less than RM40 million based on the audited financial statements for FY20.
Thanks to the relief measures introduced by Bursa and the Securities Commission Malaysia, AirAsia was not classified as a PN17 listed issuer and was not required to comply with the obligations under Paragraph 8.04 and PN17 of the Main LR for a period of 18 months from the date of the first relief announcement.
The date of the first relief announcement was July 8, 2020, and the 18-month period ended on Jan 7, 2022.
Under the relief measures, companies that triggered any of the suspended criteria between April 17, 2020 and June 30, 2021 would not be classified as a PN17 and Guidance Note 3 (GN3) company for 12 months.
The waiver was extended twice since then, with the latest extension granting companies that trigger the PN17 or GN3 suspended criteria between July 1, 2021 and Dec 31, 2021 an 18-month relief period, compared with 12 months previously.
AirAsia has been in the red for the past two years, posting a net loss of RM283 million for FY19 and RM5.89 billion for FY20.
In FY21, the group posted a bigger net loss of RM887 million for the third quarter from RM851.78 million in the previous corresponding quarter, as the Malaysian and Indonesian markets continued to face travel restrictions amid Covid-19 containment efforts.
The airline had said that the net loss was also due to investment in technology, talent and network as AirAsia continued to scale up its digital super app and its air cargo division Teleport.
Quarterly revenue fell 36.9% to RM295.89 million from RM468.94 million a year earlier.
For the nine months ended Sept 30, 2021, AirAsia's net loss narrowed to RM2.23 billion from RM2.66 billion in the same period of FY20, even as revenue fell by a third to RM1.02 billion from RM2.97 billion.
The airline had also triggered the prescribed criteria pursuant to Paragraph 8.04 and Paragraph 2.1(a) of PN17 of Bursa's Main Market Listing Requirements (Main LR), where AirAsia’s shareholders' equity on a consolidated basis was 25% or less of its share capital and such shareholders' equity is less than RM40 million based on the audited financial statements for FY20.
If the shareholders are not making any further attempts to show their concerns and personal commitment to inject funds, it's as good as a dead P17 company.
Personally l felt government play an important role to revive airlines. By closing borders the airlines unable to survive. Second Bursa is in appropriate to grant right issues last year and causing more pain for investors. Finally PN17 is real for AirAsia as heavy debts and may not easy to turn around as long as government close borders. With PN17 Airsia got 12 months to regulate its accounts an in a brink of bankruptcy...
While everyone is watching a nice show here, don't forget to watch your own backyard as well, indeed the fire in here is bigger, but those so-called profit-making stocks also getting burnt same time.
Some stocks downs since morning and never bounce back yet (linear down, making glove one, don't say no hint), those who play IDSS, you will short a volatile stock like AA or short the one with linear line down? Mind your own risk!
Since here many kind investors always share reminder, so I learned a little bit from here also sharing a reminder.
Every country support their own airlines.. But we have MAS. government support one MAS also left half life. support airasia some more will gg. Khairy also said we cannot afford lockdown = no more money.
Aircraft maintenance provisions and liabilities = 5.86 billion
Lease liabilities The lease liabilities amounting to RM13.9 billion includes deferred aircraft leases of approximately RM2.5 billion. The lease liabilities are supported by ROU of RM9.4 billion (net of impairment) and finance lease receivables of RM0.5 billion (net of impairment).
During the current quarter, a total of 17 aircraft leases had been restructured. The restructuring of the leases resulted in the lease liabilities being recomputed using the new lease terms and reduced lease rates. The past due amounts waived was approximately RM187.8 million.
This book is the result of the author's many years of experience and observation throughout his 26 years in the stockbroking industry. It was written for general public to learn to invest based on facts and not on fantasies or hearsay....
kyliew
1,383 posts
Posted by kyliew > 2022-01-14 11:33 | Report Abuse
If history repeat like SD, I foresee there will be another LD next few days